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Abstract 
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: The 2014 Farm Bill required Kansas producers to make a 
series of enrollment decisions that were both complicated and based on incomplete information. 
With this bill, producers were required to complete a one-time enrollment in one of three 
programs (ARC-CO, PLC, or ARC-IC) to serve as a safety net for poor crop prices and/or yields 
over the five-year life of the legislation. Analyzing the effects of incomplete information on 
producers’ decisions provides an opportunity to identify challenges associated with program 
selection under the 2014 Farm Bill and suggest changes for future farm support legislation. 
METHODS: Kansas county-level enrollment data obtained from USDA-FSA are used to model 
aggregate producer sign-up decisions as a function of estimated 2014 payments, county-level 
yield variability, prior program enrollment, and extension programming efforts at the county and 
state level. This OLS model is subsequently replicated using individual producer data from 
surveys conducted during fifteen extension meetings held across Kansas. The model based on 
individual data is a regression of stated preferences for the three programs as a function of farm 
size, farmer demographics, risk preferences, and knowledge of the legislation. RESULTS: 
Comparisons of model results from the aggregated enrollment data and the individual survey 
data offer insights into the factors affecting producer decisions. Specifically, aggregate 
enrollment decisions are difficult to explain given many unobservable enrollment considerations 
at a county level. However, when the regression is repeated using individual data, other factors 
affect the enrollment decision such as the number of years a producer has been farming, the size 
of the farm, their membership in commodity associations, and their risk preferences. 
CONCLUSIONS: The 2014 Farm Bill required producers to select participation in a single 
support program for the five-year life of the legislation. This decision had to be made without 
knowing exactly how crop prices and yields would behave in the future. It is important to 
understand how producers made their decisions based on incomplete information to inform 
future legislative efforts for an effective farm safety net. This research expands that 
understanding by analyzing both aggregate and individual data to determine the factors that 
influence program choice. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
From the implementation of the first farm bill in the United States with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933, various commodity producer protection programs have seen a 
rise and fall within the agricultural sphere. As the agricultural industry has evolved from a time 
of high labor inclusion rates, modest productivity and high government intervention as was the 
case in the 1930s and 40s, to its current state of large sums of land being very effectively utilized 
by a small number of farmers, such has been the change in farm subsidies offered by the various 
farm bills from 1933 to 2014. These changes are illustrated by the development of farm 
programs from production controls and parity income discussions during the early years of farm 
bills to the current revenue protection and support programs utilized in 2014. 
This paper analyzes the two major programs of the 2014 Farm Bill and illustrates how 
conditions of incomplete information played a role in Kansas producers’ enrollment choices in 
the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs. Three primary 
research questions have been identified for this analysis to provide a contribution to the 
literature: i) What factors affected producer enrollment in commodity programs at both the 
aggregate and individual level? ii) What role did incomplete information play in determining 
program selection? (That is, did producers have to rely on alternative criteria to select a program 
given a lack of quality information available for their primary enrollment considerations?) iii) 
What do the results of this research suggest for the development and implementation of future 
farm policy? 
By utilizing Farm Service Agency (FSA) Farm Bill Enrollment Data obtained from a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request as well as survey data collected from attendees of 
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program information meetings conducted by K-State Research and Extension Services, two 
separate models are developed for analysis. An OLS regression compares county level 
enrollment data to an aggregation of the survey results in order to analyze county level 
enrollment factors. Additionally, it will assess whether or not the survey results are 
representative of the state’s actual program enrollment for the state’s four main crops: wheat, 
corn, soybeans and grain sorghum. A logit model is then estimated using individual-level data to 
determine producer-specific enrollment considerations.  
As agricultural production represents the largest sector of the Kansas economy, valued at 
over $64 million annually (43% of the total economy), the analysis of predicted and actual 
enrollment is crucial in giving insight into producers’ decision-making processes (Floros 2016). 
Termination of payments, land price changes as a result of mass farm foreclosures, federal 
spending concerns, and commodity supply changes are all potential threats facing agriculture 
that could be affected by the safety net program that producers selected. Additionally, the current 
downturn facing the agricultural sector coupled with political pressure to reduce federal 
expenditures only intensifies the need for an effective and economically sustainable safety net. 
Due to the nature of the one-time enrollment for the five-year life of the 2014 Farm Bill, it is 
imperative to understand how producers made their program selection. Understanding this 
decision-making process will assist in mitigating any potential risks for future farm legislation 
based off of potential losses that producers (or government entities responsible for distributing 
subsidies) might face if catastrophic losses occur. 
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Chapter 2 - Political Context 
 Framing the evolution of U.S. farm policy programs begins with looking at the state of 
agriculture in the 1920s and 30s. The country was in the midst of the Great Depression while 
those living in the Midwest struggled with a dust bowl that greatly affected agricultural 
production. Overproduction of commodities in addition to increased nationalism after World 
War I reduced trade opportunities and led to a steep decline in agricultural prices. The creation of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was intended to bring farm income to parity with non-
farm income by limiting production and implementing a price floor for crops (Zulauf and Orden 
2014). Over time, U.S. agricultural policy evolved to include nutrition programs, conservation, 
and rural development. Crop insurance and disaster relief also saw inclusion beginning in the 
1970s and 80s. While price-based income supports were maintained, production quotas were 
replaced in favor of direct payments with the 1996 Farm Bill. With the exception of program 
name changes and minor details (such as what price a floor would be set at), commodity 
programs saw few major changes from 1996 to 2008 (Zulauf and Orden 2014). 
The design and eventual passage of the Agricultural Act of 2014 was the result of three 
years of cantankerous debate. External factors threatening the bill’s survival included an 
economic recession, political unrest caused by a conservative revolution from the Tea Party, 
record high farm incomes as a result of high commodity prices, and multiple competing interests 
across the food and fiber sector. Additionally, trade disputes over U.S. farm policy at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and potential bilateral and multilateral trade agreements affected the 
design of the legislation. Understanding the lead-up to the political firestorm that occurred over 
the 2014 Farm Bill becoming law requires analysis of the bill’s predecessor— The Food, 
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Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008—and its role in shaping the 2014 Farm Bill’s key 
provisions.  
From 2003 through the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill, farm incomes reached record 
highs as a result of tremendous price spikes and relatively good harvests. Prior to passing the 
2008 bill, there was a belief that farm incomes would only continue to increase. However, crop 
prices continued to be volatile while producer costs increased, creating a precarious situation for 
the farm economy. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) sought the opinion of a 
variety of industry stakeholders and producers in 2006 to discuss what direction the 2008 Farm 
Bill should take (Woolverton and Young 2009). Those wishing to limit or end farm subsidies 
saw high farm incomes as an opportunity to limit spending on commodity programs. Other 
opponents to farm safety net spending felt that funds would be better utilized by boosting 
conservation, energy, and nutrition programs. Representatives of farm groups believed that 
programs under the 2002 Farm Bill were beneficial and should be continued without major 
changes. However, some industry groups advocated for changes that would provide payments to 
reflect changes to farm revenues—a system that no previous farm legislation had implemented.  
As a result of these discussions, USDA outlined proposals for the 2008 legislation that 
would continue commodity support while making farm subsidies more market oriented and in-
line with agreements under the WTO (Woolverton and Young 2009).The final bill mostly met 
these provisions by providing decoupled direct and counter-cyclical payments (CCP) tied to base 
acreage as opposed to planted acres. Additionally, for the first time, a revenue-based program 
was introduced as a commodity safety net. Titled Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE), the 
program utilized national commodity prices and state-level yields to determine if a producer’s 
market revenue had declined to such a degree it triggered a payment. Producers could receive a 
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payout equivalent to up to 22.5% of their revenue if either (or both) yield or price reductions 
caused a loss at the state level. The difference between a state’s guarantee and actual state 
revenue would then represent the payment a producer would receive. In order to enroll in the 
ACRE program, producers were required to forego any counter-cyclical payments in addition to 
a 30% reduction in rates for loan deficiency payments (LDPs) and a 20% reduction in direct 
payment values (USDA-FSA 2009). 
Despite positive assessments from economists indicating that ACRE payments were all 
but certain for major crops such as corn, wheat, and soybeans, national enrollment in 2009 
represented roughly only 13% of base acreage on 7.8% of FSA farm numbers (Rejesus 2013). 1 
In Kansas, only 11% of Kansas producers enrolled in the ACRE program in 2013 (USDA-FSA 
2015). There are many potential reasons for why ACRE enrollment was low compared with the 
traditional programs. Through a mail survey of Iowa farmers, Edwards (2011) found that 87% of 
those surveyed stated they did not enroll in ACRE due to the complexity of the program. 
Another 85% and 82% of producers feared losing their direct payments and the possibility of 
losing loan deficiency payments, respectively. Other potential reasons for forgoing ACRE 
enrollment for these producers included incomplete farm yield data, unlikelihood of receiving a 
payment, marketing loan rates, discrepancy between farm and state yields, negotiations with 
landlords, and satisfaction with traditional farm safety nets. 
An analysis conducted by Woolverton and Young (2009) for the Economic Research 
Service (ERS) of USDA postured that several factors contributed to ACRE enrollment including 
forgone direct payments, price and yield uncertainties, and learning and transaction costs 
                                                 
1 This discrepancy indicates that larger farms were more apt to enroll in ACRE.  
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associated with program complexity and negotiations with landlords (Woolverton and Young 
2009). Additionally, a study utilizing survey data conducted by Mitchell et al. (2012) found that 
attitudes and beliefs affected producers’ intentions but found little evidence to support that it 
altered their actual enrollment decision. Additionally, they argued that since producers enrolled 
in ACRE in such low numbers, despite most economic reports indicating the benefits of 
enrolling in ACRE, producers considered more than just the potential payouts of the program 
(Mitchell et al. 2012).  
Regardless of the lack of enrollment for ACRE, the lead-up to the 2014 Farm Bill still 
involved contentious discussions on the need for a revenue based program. Whereas the 2008 
bill (passed by a Democratic majority in Congress) focused efforts on expanding nutrition 
programs, such as the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), and mostly 
maintaining the status quo for commodity programs, the 2014 bill discussion saw a politically 
divided Congress. Given that farm incomes were so high, some stakeholders sought to eliminate 
direct payments entirely and direct all support money into enhanced revenue programs and the 
strengthening of crop insurance. As the federal deficit rose (bolstered by high SNAP and crop 
insurance indemnity payments), industry groups calling for programs that captured price and 
yield risk but accounted for high incomes were pitted against fiscal conservatives in the newly 
formed Tea Party. Discussions to reach a consensus for a 2012 bill could not be reached and 
most provisions of the 2008 bill were extended through September 2013 as an emergency 
measure (Orden and Zulauf 2015).  
The 2012 elections proved to further complicate farm policy discussions as sequestration 
of the federal budget began in March of 2013 and affected $6 billion in farm safety net and 
conservation funding over the following 10 year period. Gridlock amongst Congress and the 
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White House continued, and led to a partial government shutdown in early October of 2013. In 
mid-October, negotiations were reached and the federal debt ceiling was extended. House 
Republicans seized on this opportunity to criticize spending on both commodity and nutrition 
programs and managed to pass bills that separated the two titles from each other. However, 
amidst scrutiny about the lack of progress towards a final bill and pressure to pass major 
legislation, the House and Senate reconciled to pass the Agricultural Act of 2014. It was signed 
into law in February of 2014 (Orden and Zulauf 2015).  
While political tensions certainly affected the programs offered in the 2014 legislation, 
competing interests across regions also played a role in the types of support offered. In research 
conducted by Barnett and Coble (2011), they illustrated the difference in desired farm programs 
between Midwestern farmers that grew primarily corn, wheat, and soybeans as opposed to 
Southern farmers growing cotton, rice, and peanuts. Despite many Southern farmers growing 
larger amounts of corn and soybeans than in previous times, their base acres (and thereby 
commodity payments) were primarily in high value crops such as rice and cotton. Due to the 
high direct payments associated with the crops tied to Southern base acreage, less than 1% of 
acres in Southern states such as Arkansas, Texas, Georgia, Mississippi and Louisiana were 
enrolled in the ACRE program (Barnett and Coble 2011).  
Surprisingly, Barnett and Coble found that despite the fact that yield risk tends to be 
higher in Southern states, producers in Southern regions purchase less crop insurance than their 
Midwest counterparts. This preference against insurance illustrates why Southern farmers were 
not in favor of reallocating Farm Bill money to insurance programs. As Southern producers were 
better off by not enrolling in ACRE and benefitted little from crop insurance due to their lack of 
participation, they had the incentive to lobby for price based programs that had traditionally been 
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included in previous bills (Barnett and Coble 2011). Speculation surrounding the severity of 
regional disagreement on 2014 programs was so great that it was believed to be the cause of the 
removal of Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas as the ranking member of the Senate Agriculture 
Committee in favor of Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi (Wyant 2013).  
The resulting legislation comprised of programs that appeased both Midwestern farmers 
seeking revenue programs while also maintaining price-based income supports for Southern 
farmers. Additionally, cotton supports were altered to address Brazil’s WTO case against the 
U.S. by offering an insurance based program in place of direct payments and CCP that was titled 
“Stacked Income Protection Plan”, or STAX for short (USDA-RMA 2013). As this analysis 
focuses on producers of Kansas’s major commodities, only an explanation of ARC and PLC will 
be further explained.  
PLC served as the successor for the CCP and direct payment programs. All direct 
payments were eliminated and payment triggers for commodities were set at a national reference 
price that was permanent for the five year life of the legislation. The per bushel strike prices of 
the major Kansas commodities are as follows: wheat-- $5.50, corn-- $3.70, soybeans-- $8.40, and 
sorghum—$3.95. PLC payments are limited to $125,000 per producer, per entity, with another 
$125,000 offered if a spouse contributes to the operation. Payments are issued on 85% of base 
acreage. In conjunction with PLC, producers had the option in enrolling in an optional insurance 
program titled Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO). This program triggered an indemnity 
payment when there was a yield or revenue loss at the county level. PLC serves as the default 
program and any producer that did not enroll by the deadline automatically was assigned PLC 
and forfeited any 2014 payments (USDA-CCC 2015). Due to the high payment cap, PLC was 
widely viewed by experts as a catastrophic coverage option. 
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The reformed ACRE program, ARC, came with two different options— individual 
(ARC-I) or county (ARC-CO). ARC-I utilized all covered commodities grown on a farm to 
compare total farm revenue to that of the county. If a producer’s total revenue was below that of 
the county guarantee, a producer would receive a payment representing the difference. The 
payment was calculated based on 65% of base acreage and covered losses in between 14%-24% 
to coincide with crop insurance deductibles. This 10% revenue safety net represented a much 
more shallow coverage than that offered by PLC. As ARC-I was coupled to a producer’s yields 
and market prices, it is viewed as non-compliant by WTO standards (Schnepf 2015). 
Additionally, as approximately one percent of producers enrolled in ARC-I nationwide it proved 
to not be a popular program among producers (USDA-FAS 2016b).2 
Whereas ARC-I utilized farm yields, ARC-CO based its payment structure and 
guarantees on yields of the county. As was the case with ARC-I, ARC-CO was effective in 
covering losses on 76%-86% of revenues. However, it covered 85% of base acreage as opposed 
to ARC-I’s 65%. Revenue benchmarks for ARC-CO utilized a moving Olympic Average (OA) 
for prices and yields. Marketing Year Average (MYA) prices for the previous five years are 
averaged after dropping the highest and lowest price. This process is also used to calculate the 
OA yield. The OA yield is then multiplied by the higher of either the OA price or the national 
reference price to determine the county guarantee. When a producer’s revenue falls below this 
threshold, they receive a payment (USDA-FSA 2016a). Originally, county yields were figured 
based on the FSA office assigned to a producer for program enrollment. However, given that 
                                                 
2 Due to its noncompliance and low enrollment rates, ARC-I was not included in this analysis or reviewed in-depth. 
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some counties did not have FSA offices, changes were later made to allow each county their own 
yield calculation.  
The flexibility offered by PLC and ARC achieved lawmakers’ goal of appeasing 
producers in Midwestern and Southern states. Fiscal conservatives also considered the bill a 
success as the elimination of direct payments created a $41 billion reduction over a ten year 
period (Orden and Zulauf 2015).  Additionally, farms with adjusted gross income (AGI) three 
year averages above $900,000 were ineligible for payments (Durst and Williams 2016). 
However, given that producers were only able to make program selections once limited the 
ability of estimating actual costs of the commodity programs. As yields and prices can fluctuate, 
forecasts of expected payouts in later years of the legislation hold little value as they vary wildly 
(Orden and Zulauf 2015).  With the exception of ARC-I, 2014 commodity programs also 
continue a market-oriented approach by remaining decoupled from current production—although 
provisions of the 2014 bill allowed producers the opportunity to update their historical yield and 
crop base acreage allocations.  
While this update gave producers the ability to have payments more accurately reflect 
their operation, it also presented them with even more choices to weigh when considering a 
program choice. With the complexity of ARC payments and the multiple payment outcomes 
given different yield and crop base acreage update strategies, producers were forced to weigh 
many alternatives. The original sign-up deadline was extended to April 7th, 2015 in order to give 
producers more time to educate themselves on various enrollment outcomes (USDA-FASb 
2015). In the state of Kansas, the 2014 Farm Bill saw the largest joint educational effort in the 
state’s history. Extension agents, economists at Kansas State University, and Kansas Farm 
Management Association (KFMA) specialists held 179 meetings with 11,256 producers and 
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performed 3,253 individual consultations for over 8,743 Farm Service Agency farm numbers 
between mid-October 2014 and the end of March 2015 as illustrated by figure 2.1. 
Figure 2-1: Educational Meeting Attendance 
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review 
 Decision-making under Incomplete Information 
For both the PLC and ARC programs, pricing and/or yield estimates were largely 
unknown for later years of the legislation and led to producers enrolling in a program based on 
incomplete market information. Therefore it is important to understand how producers made this 
enrollment decision given their risk profiles. By jointly estimating parameters for individual risk 
preferences and production functions, Chavas and Holt (1996) were able to analyze what 
behaviors producers exhibited when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Their 
research utilized corn-soybean allocation choices under production and price uncertainty from 
1954-1985. Special care was given to capture the effect of farm policy programs on prices and 
incomes received at the farm level. The results of the analysis indicated that corn-soybean 
farmers displayed downside risk aversion as well as decreasing absolute risk aversion (Chavas 
and Holt 1996). 
According to research by Martin Weber (1987), traditional subjective expected utility 
theory’s strong information assumptions can be relaxed in order to create a framework for 
individuals to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. His approach sought to make the 
theoretical decision-making framework more applicable to real-life scenarios. Weber argued that 
a general model for decision-making under conditions of incomplete information could be 
developed by aggregating an individual’s attributed preferences and allowing for alternatives to 
be ranked. In order for this framework to be applicable, the function of preferences and ranked 
alternatives must implicitly or explicitly answer four basic questions: 
1. What is the value of a decision’s consequence on the desired objective of a 
decision? 
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2. What is the individual’s risk profile for the given decision? 
3. What is the aggregation of evaluation for objectives for each consequence? 
4. What is the aggregation of consequences for each objective? (Weber 1987). 
Producers enrolling in 2014 Farm Bill programs would likely have followed a similar 
framework in selecting a commodity program. A producer would have selected a program given 
their individual risk preferences, desired objectives for Farm Bill program utilization (minimize 
losses, maximize payments, etc.), and any potential consequences they foresaw for each program 
option.  
 Economic Implications of the 2014 Farm Bill 
Amidst concerns over the federal deficit as well as the enactment of a budget 
sequestration in 2013, one of the main goals of the 2014 bill was to reduce federal spending from 
previous years. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated outlays to total $489 million 
from 2014-2018. Figure 3.1 indicates that the vast majority of expenditures were earmarked for 
nutrition programs with only 5% of the budget allocated to commodity programs.  
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Figure 3-1: Expected Outlays for 2014 Farm Bill (2014-2018) 
  
Initial CBO estimates released prior to the bill’s enactment indicated that the total value 
of payments issued under the 2014 Farm Bill would be less than those of the 2008 bill by $14.3 
billion over the 2014-2023 period (CBO 2014b).  Additionally, the revised commodity programs 
were predicted to reduce the federal deficit by $16.6 billion over that same period (CBO 2014b). 
This was in part due to the elimination of direct payments and maximum payment limits placed 
on both the PLC and ARC programs, in addition to caps placed on payment eligibility for high 
income producers. However, given the variability of future prices and yields when compared to 
forecasts, actual payment values are unknown. It is also important to note that CBO projections 
only included programs authorized with mandatory funding and does not include estimates for 
any discretionary funding set by Congress (USDA-ERS 2014).  
Updated baseline projections released by the CBO in January of 2017 estimate that 
between 2017-2027, PLC and ARC will increase expenditures by nearly $6.4 billion more than 
forecasted in March of 2016. However, this increase is largely due to a $12.8 billion increase in 
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PLC outlays. Conversely, ARC is expected to see a decrease in expenditures of $6.4 billion when 
compared with the 2016 projections over the same period (CBO 2014a). The wildly varied 
estimate of outlays illustrates the many uncertainties associated with a one-time enrollment for a 
five year piece of legislation. Just as producers were uncertain what each program would pay, the 
CBO and members of Congress tasked with designing the bill were equally as unprepared to 
provide definitive and accurate estimates of the programs’ cost. 
Farm Policy Preferences 
The design and implementation of farm policy programs that provide adequate safety nets 
to farmers in various regions and across commodities has proved increasingly complicated over 
the course of history. One of the most unique (and challenging) aspects of U.S. agriculture is its 
diversity. According to research published by Offutt in 2002, farm net worth for the largest farm 
operations is twice of that for smaller “family” farms and four times that of the average 
American household. Additionally, as farm operators and owners become increasingly more 
educated, they are more likely to diversify and engage in income-earning activities aside from 
their farming operation. Lastly, an increased push for the development of urban farms has 
created a disparity between farm incomes in rural and urban areas (Offutt 2002). 
Offutt also argued that when considering preferences for farm policies at the individual 
level, the understanding that farm operators are both producers and consumers is often 
overlooked. Too much emphasis is placed on commodity markets and prices as well as farm 
incomes to assess producers’ welfare. Interestingly, increases in farm families’ well-being has 
been accredited to the increase in off-farm employment for many farming operations. Further, 
Offutt argues that traditional empirical methods for evaluating how individual producers benefit 
or lose from various farm policies relies too heavily on inadequate data. These data have the 
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potential to be thin and non-representative of a producer as well as too aggregated to accurately 
assess the effects of farm policies at the micro level. Given the aforementioned diversity across 
producers in the U.S., a one-size fits all modeling approach for examining the effects of 
agricultural policies does little to explain their impact at a disaggregated level. Understanding 
both producers’ consumption choices and utility functions as well as their production functions, 
beliefs and attitudes about the role of farm policy programs, and their levels of risk aversion 
should all be considered when estimating farm policies and their outcomes (Offutt 2002). 
 Producer Risk Profiles 
In conjunction with Federal Crop Insurance programs, Kansas producers utilize 
commodity program selections available under the 2014 Farm Bill as an ad-hoc method of risk 
management for their farming operation. Various studies have attempted to standardize risk 
management priorities for a given subset of producers based on characteristics such as farming 
experience, farm size, etc. with mixed results. Utilizing Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS) data, Cole and Kirwan (2009) analyzed the factors effecting a producer’s 
decision to hedge their crop—a decision used as a proxy for engaging in risk management 
strategies. The data included information from over 50,000 commercial farms between the years 
1999 to 2005. By using a linear probability model, they were able to estimate specific farm and 
producer characteristics to estimate the likelihood of the farm engaging in hedging. 
Their research yielded several key results. In broad terms, risk management practices for 
farms behave similarly to those of households or firms. However, they also found evidence to 
suggest that farms did not follow financial theory. Key findings of their analysis indicate that 
older farmers were shown to be less likely to engage in hedging their crops. This could be due to 
a variety of factors such as lower levels of technological literacy. A producer’s experience as 
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well as their education levels proved to have little to no significant impact on a producer’s 
decision to engage in hedging practices. Lastly, their results suggested that farms that grow a 
larger variety of crops are less likely to engage in hedging activities as their business is 
sufficiently diversified in order to mitigate the effects of risk (Cole and Kirwan 2009). 
While aggregate analysis like that conducted by Cole and Kirwan can yield insights into 
aggregate risk management by farms, understanding the components of an individual producer’s 
risk management strategy is a trying and complex task. The many uncertainties and exogenous 
factors facing agriculture coupled with the many, varied factors of production creates a 
heterogeneous distribution of where an individual producer could fall on a risk spectrum. 
Determining how exactly a producer employs commodity programs to contribute to their specific 
risk management system proves equally difficult. While some producers select programs in order 
to maximize payments, others make enrollment selections based on mitigating their losses in low 
revenue years. 
Plastina and Hart (2014) determined commodity program selection was a function of an 
individual’s price and yield expectations, the producer’s production model, as well as a 
producer’s unique risk profile. In their study, they utilized the Iowa State University Farm Bill 
Analyzer Microsoft Excel tool3 to conduct a Monte Carlo simulation of prices and yields in order 
to calculate randomized estimated payments. The results of their research indicated that price 
expectations were an important component in the expected payment calculation. They also 
concluded that differing risk profiles caused some producers to enroll in programs that did not 
                                                 
3 This tool utilized historical and user-provided data to project potential farm and county yields. Additionally, 
producers were able to select from three separate price forecasts and anticipated price volatility levels in order to 
estimate a payment value based on their market expectations. 
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maximize anticipated payment values. Risk averse producers concerned about low yields and 
prices, for instance, could be more inclined to select a program that did not maximize payment, 
but instead, minimized potential losses. The results of their research indicate that payment 
maximization, while an important program selection determinant, did not fully explain how 
producers were making their enrollment decisions. Furthermore, their research suggests that 
there are a variety of factors that cannot be captured when analyzing the roll that risk 
management plays on an individual producer’s program choice (Plastina and Hart 2014). 
 Analysis of Revenue Based Program Enrollment 
Revenue based farm support programs were not utilized prior to the 2008 Farm Bill. This 
prevented extensive analysis from being conducted about the benefits and losses of such a 
program for different stakeholders or to attempt to determine the mechanisms by which a 
producer made an enrollment decision. Despite their differences, ARC and ACRE both required 
producers to reevaluate what role they desired their farm safety nets to serve. While a more 
complex decision, electing to enroll in a revenue protection program gave producers the 
opportunity to better protect themselves from downside risk since yield and price components 
were both factored into triggering a payment in the new revenue based system. Understanding 
potential factors contributing to ACRE enrollment is crucial in making informed assumptions 
about the thought process implemented by producers in selecting ARC in 2014.  
 Role of Revenue Assistance Programs 
During the lead-up to the creation and passage of the 2008 Farm Bill, lawmakers and 
farm policy analysts alike sought to reform U.S. commodity programs. As was the case in 1983 
and the early 1990s, studies were conducted to analyze the effects of a revenue based program. 
An analysis conducted by Coble and Dismukes (2008) attempted to capture both payment values 
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and risk reduction ability for three alternatives to the 2002 Farm Bill programs. The three 
alternatives included a revenue based program as a function of the same base acres and program 
yields used in calculating the CCP program authorized by the 2002 bill. The design of Coble and 
Dismukes’s revenue payment was issued on 85% of base acreage and guaranteed up to 90% of a 
farmer’s revenue given the aggregation level of the model: national, state, or county.  
While this formulation differed from how ACRE (the first-ever revenue-based 
commodity program) functioned, it very closely resembled ACRE’s successor: ARC-CO. The 
results of their analysis indicated that revenue programs triggered larger payment amounts for 
corn, wheat, and soybeans than the current 2002 programs as well as offering higher percentages 
of risk reduction. Their results showed variation between levels of aggregation. Specifically, 
county-level revenue programs averaged payment values of $5.50, $3.77, and $9.34 per acre 
higher than the current programs for corn, soybeans, and wheat, respectively. Risk reduction 
values averaged near par for corn, with soybeans and wheat seeing an increase of 0.92% and 
3.57%.  
The results of this analysis also illustrate that, since revenue is a function of both prices 
and yields, it captures a natural hedge between the two. As such, revenue based programs are no 
more or less likely to alter government expenditures on commodity programs. Other factors 
including prices, revenue guarantees, and the geographic level to which a revenue program 
calculated payments would drive the costs of a revenue program and could vary. As their results 
indicated, more disaggregated regions triggered higher payments for all three crops when 
compared to 2002 programs or national and state aggregations. An additional component of their 
research explored the role of such programs in conjunction with other aspects of farm policy 
legislation including crop insurance and LDPs and found that while revenue programs are 
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effective at risk reduction, their joint use with other programs can actually cause losses in risk 
reduction efficiency (Coble and Dismukes 2008).  
 Factors Affecting ACRE Program Enrollment 
Given what is now known about how revenue based programs perform when compared 
to previous Farm Bill programs, it is imperative to understand what specific factors lead a 
producer to break with familiarity and enroll in ACRE. In an analysis conducted by the ERS on 
ACRE enrollment, primary factors driving program selection included the following: price 
expectations, yields expectations, correlation between state and farm-level yields, a producer’s 
risk preferences, the costs of learning the program and negotiating with renters (when 
applicable), as well as the changes to a producer’s previous subsidy payment under the 2002 bill. 
As previously stated, a producer was required to forfeit 20% of their direct payments in the event 
that they selected ACRE as their program choice. Additionally, it was an irrevocable decision—
once a producer was enrolled in ACRE, they were bound to it for the remaining life of the bill. 
For producers of high value crop base acres such as rice, there was less incentive to enroll in 
ACRE due to this forfeiture. With direct payment values averaging nearly $100 per acre, ACRE 
offered little promise in offsetting the lost revenue from a mandatory reduction in direct 
payments regardless of whether the CCP program was expected to payout (Woolverton and 
Young 2009).  
As ACRE was a revenue based program, yield and price components were both factored 
into calculating expected payment values. However, given the ongoing volatility of commodity 
markets at the time of the bill’s implementation, price fluctuations weighed much heavier in a 
producer’s enrollment decision. Due to the high prices that commodities had seen in the years 
preceding the debate of the bill, target prices for the CCP remained high for corn, wheat, rice and 
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soybeans. As a result, the likelihood of one of these crops triggering a CCP payment was 
unlikely except in the event of catastrophic price decline. CCP did offer low target prices for 
cotton and peanuts, however, making them more attractive to producers of those crops. 
Projections for the 09/10 crop year by USDA indicated that price guarantees for the ACRE 
program were at least 10% lower than the CCP target for barley, oats, corn, grain sorghum, and 
wheat. When calculating a two year average, soybeans and cotton prices were also nearly 10% 
lower than the guarantee.  
To illustrate factors affecting ACRE enrollment, ERS simulated producers of several 
basic commodities across four regions of the Great Plains and South: 
1. Producer from Iowa growing corn/soybeans 
2. Producer from South Dakota growing primarily wheat 
3. Producer from Georgia growing corn/cotton 
4. Producer from Mississippi growing soybeans/rice 
The farms were designed to represent typical planted and base acreage by utilizing National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and ARMS data. As ACRE was a state level revenue 
program, payments to each farm were estimated assuming that farm-level benchmark revenue 
equaled the state guarantee for each state. In each simulation, revenue shortfalls of 0%, 5%, 10%, 
15% and 20% were estimated given the historic base acreage of each farm (Woolverton and 
Young 2009).  
 For the first farm, a 10% revenue shortfall would trigger payments of $8.08, $19.58, and 
$20.13 on base acres of corn, soybeans, and wheat, respectively. Maximizing payments, this 
producer’s ACRE payment for 2009 would total $9,865. By comparison, the direct payment 
reduction for this farm would total $9,900 over the four year life of the legislation—illustrating 
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that ACRE provided a larger safety net for this specific state/crop mix. For the South Dakota 
wheat farm, a producer would receive an ACRE payment large enough to offset lost direct 
payments even without a reduction in expected revenues given 2009 projections. The Georgia 
cotton farm would require a 15% reduction in revenue for one year in order to offset four years 
of direct payments. However, given the likelihood that cotton base would generate CCP or 
potential qualifying for marketing-loans, this producer would not likely benefit from enrolling in 
ACRE. In order to offset the high direct payments for rice base acres on the final farm, a 
producer would require a reduction in revenue of at least 12% for one year. Given that USDA 
had projected rice prices to be only 8% lower than the ACRE guarantee, CCP proved to be the 
more attractive program. 
 As indicated by the simulations and anticipated pricing structures, ACRE served as a 
superior alternative to CCP and direct payments for corn, grain sorghum, wheat, and soybeans. 
Rice, cotton, and peanuts generated larger payment values when electing not to enroll in ACRE. 
However, despite this payment analysis, many producers rejected ACRE and opted for the 
programs similar to those offered by the 2002 Farm Bill. This indicates that other factors such as 
those suggested in Woolverton and Young’s research (including risk preferences and transaction 
costs associated with learning the program and negotiating with landlords) factored heavily into 
a producers decision (Woolverton and Young 2009). 
Research presented by Mitchell et al. (2012) further supported ERS’s broad assessment 
of what factors contributed to enrolling in ACRE.  In an attempt to capture producers’ sign-up 
intentions, the analysis utilized a mail survey that was carried out prior to the ACRE sign-up 
deadline to construct a multivariate logit. Mitchell et al. summarized other studies that reinforced 
ERS’s analysis that producers growing crops such as corn, wheat, and soybeans would benefit 
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from the ACRE program. Additionally, the researchers also described how additional research 
had concluded that ACRE provided better risk protection based on its increased threshold of 
minimum revenue when compared to current insurance programs. However, no analysis had yet 
compared producers’ intentions with actual enrollment—a topic Mitchell et al.’s analysis 
intended to focus on. Their research sought to utilize recognized enrollment factors (i.e. potential 
payouts, risk preferences, learning and transaction costs, demographics, etc.) in order to 
determine how closely producer enrollment intentions mirrored actual ACRE signups. By 
incorporating elements of theory of planned behavior, Mitchell et al. presented the first research 
illustrating the impact that potentially unobservable characteristics such as attitudes and beliefs 
had on program selection (Mitchell et al. 2012). 
The survey utilized data from randomly sampled farms in Mississippi, Texas, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin. NASS was contracted to conduct the survey in order to utilize farms 
from its records. Farms with the lowest 20% of gross incomes were eliminated from the sample 
in order to capture commercial farms. Additionally, producers were required to produce corn, 
wheat, rice, soybeans or grain sorghum in order to participate. Surveys were mailed to 6,000 
farms across the four states of which 1,380 provided viable responses. Since the survey was 
administered prior to the sign-up deadline, producers were asked to indicate their intentions for 
sign-up at the time they completed the survey.4 Producers were given the following three 
options: 1) continue with programs utilized in the 2002 Farm Bill (direct payments and CCP) 2) 
                                                 
4 The survey administered by NASS asked producers to indicate their intended program election only for one FSA 
farm serial number. It is possible that a single producer could have multiple FSA farms enrolled in differing 
programs.  
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continue with 2002 Farm Bill programs but consider switching to ACRE in later years 3) enroll 
in ACRE for 2009.  
Summary statistics from the survey data indicated that producer demographics were 
representative of the population when compared with the 2007 Census of Agriculture 
Summaries. Independent variables utilized by the survey included whether a producer believed 
ACRE would pay more than 2002 programs, if a producer believed ACRE provided better risk 
protection than 2002 programs and producer indicated willingness to accept risk as well as their. 
Producers’ perceived risk from a farm program as well as whether the producer was a member of 
a farm organization such as the National Farmers Organization, the National Farmers Union, or 
the Grange were also included. Additionally, the survey employed a Likert scale assessment to 
ask producers separate questions about whether yield or price risk would serve as a major source 
of income risk within the next five years. The analysis further utilized variables capturing the 
level at which the household was invested in agriculture and thereby dependent on farm income, 
the farm’s debt, the producer’s dependency on government payments to contribute to the farm 
operation, if the producer was a college graduate, the producer’s age, farm size, percent of farms 
enrolled in a commodity program for 2007, and the percent of farms paying cash rent to a 
landlord for either buildings or land. Categorical variables were also included for the primary 
crop grown on the farm (corn, soybeans, cotton) and the location of the farm (North Carolina, 
Texas, Wisconsin). Lastly, the average county farm size for 2007 was also included (Mitchell et 
al. 2012).   
The summary statistics of the logit model indicated that 2.8% of producers intended to 
switch to ACRE in 2009 with another 31.3% potentially switching in subsequent years. 
Additionally, 3% of producers anticipated that ACRE would provide a larger payout than 2002 
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programs while 8% of producers felt that ACRE would provide better risk protection than 2002 
programs. For producers expressing the intention of switching to ACRE in 2009, a college 
degree or having soybeans as their primary crop increased the likelihood of switching to ACRE 
in 2009 at a 10% significance level. A producer’s reliance on government payments also 
positively impacted switching in 2009 but at a 5% significance. Believing ACRE paid more or 
that if offered better protection increased the chance a producer would switch to ACRE in 2009 
at a 1% significance level. The largest marginal effects on 2009 ACRE enrollment, however, 
were if a producer belonged to the previously mentioned farm organizations or if the producer’s 
primary crop was cotton. These characteristics negatively impacted the likelihood of a producer 
switching to ACRE in 2009 at a 1% significance level. For producers indicating that they 
intended to wait and consider switching to ACRE, the only statistically relevant factors included 
their risk aversion (which reduced the chance of enrolling in ACRE) and if their age was greater 
than 65 years old (which increased the likelihood of participating in ACRE). Both results were 
significant at the 5% level (Mitchell et al. 2012).  
The results of this research indicate that producer intentions do not always materialize. 
Given the complexity of the ACRE program and the time between the completion of the survey 
and the sign-up deadline, producers had the opportunity to be subjected to or seek out additional 
information about the program and alter their program selections accordingly. This suggests that 
while attitudes and beliefs of individual producers could have affected their intended program 
choice, there is little evidence to support that these perceptions affected actual enrollment for the 
ACRE program. It should be noted, however, that given the information published by economists 
and other professionals describing the many potential advantages of choosing ACRE over the 
traditional farm support programs, it is evident from the low ACRE enrollment rates that 
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producers considered more than just the anticipated payment for each enrollment option. This 
key observation serves as a critical factor in continuing to analyze how producers make farm 
support program enrollment decisions (Mitchell et al. 2012).  
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Chapter 4 - Model Development and Data 
As the literature suggests, there is little research that has the ability to accurately identify 
individual producers’ farm policy program preferences. Also, given that the current programs 
had not been utilized in previous legislation, the considerations made by producers in 2014 are 
currently unknown.  Understanding the key distinctions between aggregate and individual level 
enrollment considerations is crucial in the model development of this analysis. When analyzing 
enrollment factors at a county level, there are many unobservable characteristics that define each 
producer’s enrollment decision that are ultimately ignored when analyzed above the micro level. 
Aggregation of producer enrollment considerations also rely on strict assumptions that all the 
producers in a county have the same risk profile. However, the literature suggests that varying 
degrees of risk preferences was a central determinant of how producers went about selecting a 
safety net.  
It is important, therefore, for this analysis to combine elements of both aggregated and 
micro level decision-making. This analysis first compares observable enrollment characteristics 
for ARC enrollment at the county level. Survey data are then aggregated to compare to actual 
FSA enrollment figures for the four major crops of Kansas: wheat, corn, soybeans and grain 
sorghum. Upon completion of this aggregate comparison, the surveys are then further analyzed 
in an attempt to determine producer specific enrollment characteristics. The survey design 
implemented in this research closely follows Mitchell et al. (2012) and includes such factors as 
producer demographics, risk preferences, education and information sources, price and yield 
expectations, program expectations, and whether or not a producer had participated in the ACRE 
program in 2009. The results of this analysis are one of the first of its kind in analyzing factors 
affecting ARC enrollment and contribute to the available research regarding producer selection 
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of a revenue based program. Additionally, this research provides insight for policymakers 
designing future farm bills to understand the evolution of producer enrollment considerations 
from ACRE to ARC. Enrollment breakdowns by crop in addition to base acreage (prior to 
allowable updates under the 2014 bill) can be found in table 4.1. 
Table 4-1: Program Enrollment and Base Acreage by Crop 
Crop 
ARC-CO 
Enrollment 
PLC 
Enrollment 
ARC-I 
Enrollment 
Base 
Acreage 
Wheat 66.4% 33.4% 0.2% 49.5% 
Corn 76.3% 23.4% 0.3% 21.1% 
Soybeans 78.9% 0.2% 20.9% 12.9% 
Grain Sorghum 44.9% 55.0% 0.1% 15.6% 
 
Given the multi-model approach of this analysis, data were collected from a variety of 
sources. Model estimation employs county-level FSA data for 2013 Kansas ACRE enrollment 
and 2014 Farm Bill program enrollment figures. FSA county classifications for whether or not a 
county was eligible for separate payments based on if acres were irrigated or non-irrigated is also 
used.5 Additionally, NASS historical yield information, 2014 National MYA pricing data, and 
Kansas State University extension educational meeting information are utilized. 
The ARC-CO enrollment figures used in the aggregate cross-comparison model as well 
in the development of the second, individual-based analysis were obtained from surveys 
                                                 
5 In this analysis, FSA designated 7 counties as split for wheat, 29 for corn, 16 for soybeans and 2 for grain 
sorghum.  
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designed by faculty and staff of the Agricultural Economics Department at Kansas State 
University. The two surveys were collected before and after explanatory educational efforts at 
fifteen out of 179 Farm Bill program informational meetings. These meetings were conducted 
across the state of Kansas between October of 2014 and March of 2015 and attended by over 
11,000 farmers, landowners, and farm managers. 
In total, approximately 1,400 producers completed both a pre and post survey that could 
be used in the cross comparison analysis and individual program models. The surveys include 
questions such as an attendee’s classification (farmer, landowner, manager, lender, etc.), the 
number of acres owned and rented, the number of years of experience, participation in farm and 
commodity groups, a producer’s choice in information sources (meetings, online videos, 
newspapers, talking with other producers, etc.), anticipated annual payouts, expectations of 
future yields and prices, anticipated program selection both before and after program information 
was provided, insurance coverage, as well as statements that attempted to quantify risk 
preferences. It is important to note that the survey only captured expected payments, program 
choice, and crop selection for a respondent’s largest FSA farm. The complete pre and post 
survey instruments can be found in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 5 - Methods 
 County-Level and Aggregate Cross Comparison 
 Due to unobservable characteristics present when analyzing county level enrollment, a 
limited number of variables are identified as potential factors affecting program selection and 
included in the cross comparison model. These factors include the estimated payment a producer 
anticipated to receive from the ARC program, the risk variability of a county, educational 
information provided to producers about program specifics, a producer’s familiarity with a 
revenue-based Farm Bill program, and the potential for a split production method altering a 
producer’s payment (i.e. producing on both irrigated and non-irrigated acres). The following 
model is used to estimate potential enrollment factors:  
(1)  ARC_Enroll: f (Est_Pay, Yield_Std, Edu, ACRE_Perc, Split_DV), 
where ARC_Enroll represents either the percentage of producers in a county enrolling in the 
ARC program according to FSA data or the percentage of producers in a county stating in their 
post-educational meeting survey that they intended to enroll in the ARC program. Electing to 
enroll in the ARC program is analyzed utilizing an OLS regression. 
 The variable Est_Pay includes what ARC payments were expected to be prior to the 
enrollment deadline. The anticipated 2014 MYA price was pulled from the final FSA publication 
on March 10, 2015, prior to the cut-off (USDA-FAS 2015a). Projected prices are as follows:  
 Wheat: $6.00 
 Corn: $3.70 
 Soybeans: $10.20 
 Grain Sorghum: $3.90 
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Payment estimates are then calculated based on the wording of the legislation. First, a benchmark 
revenue for each county is figured. This value represents the OA yield times the OA price. As 
producers were only entitled to up to 10% revenue recovery on losses, the benchmark revenue is 
then multiplied by 0.1 to represent the maximum payment a producer could receive for their 
crop. As ARC covered losses on acreage between 76% and 86% of revenue, the benchmark 
revenue is also multiplied by 0.86 to determine a county’s guarantee. Actual expected revenue is 
determined by multiplying the 2014 NASS yield by the expected 2014 MYA price provided by 
FSA. However, given that many counties were missing 2014 NASS yields, a yield plug is used. 
To replicate likely producer calculation strategies, this plug represents the previous five years’ 
yield average. This yield value is used in the event that a county was missing its 2014 NASS 
yield. The difference between the guarantee and expected revenue is then determined. If this 
value is positive, a producer could expect to receive the smaller of either the maximum payment 
or the difference between the guarantee and expected revenue. 6  
 Twenty-year historical county level yield data pulled from NASS databases is used in 
figuring a county yield standard deviation for the Yield_Std variable. This variable attempts to 
quantify risk measures at an aggregate level across counties. As NASS data is incomplete, 
                                                 
6 In order to account for FSA enrollment data including only one percentage for counties that had an irrigated/non-
irrigated split payment, a blended payment is calculated. All counties listed as split counties by FSA had their 
previous five year planted acreage history pulled from NASS. Irrigated and non-irrigated acre payment weights are 
then determined by summing the total acres planted and the percentage that irrigated and non-irrigated acres 
comprised of the total. This weighted percentage is then applied to the estimated irrigated and non-irrigated 
payments for each split county to create one blended payment representative of the payments and portion of planted 
acres for both irrigated and non-irrigated acres. 
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however, some counties had thin yield inputs. The availability of NASS yields also differ by 
commodity. While Risk Management Agency (RMA) yield data could have been utilized to 
supplement missing NASS data, it was not information available to producers and thus 
inaccurate in mimicking how a producer might have gone about making their enrollment 
decision. 
 Previously mentioned extension educational efforts comprise the formation of the 
variable Edu. This includes any group meetings conducted by FSA extension agents, Kansas 
State University faculty and staff, or KFMA economists. It did not, however, include any 
individual consultation work. The variable ACRE_Perc represents the percent of producers in a 
county that enrolled in ACRE for the 2013 term. Split_DV is a categorical variable that captures 
the varying payments that a producer could receive for planting both irrigated and dryland acres. 
FSA made irrigated and non-irrigated designations prior to the enrollment deadline, and as such, 
producers had the ability to make separate payment calculations for acres under both production 
methods. As this model represents a county-level decision, however, it does not allow for 
separate analysis based on acreage designation.  
Model construction is then repeated for the three remaining crops. Summary statistics of 
FSA ARC enrollment indicates that 62.7% of wheat producers, 74.5% of corn producers, 74.8% 
of soybean producers, and 44% of grain sorghum producers enrolled in the ARC program. 
Payment values average $15.98, $34.60, $8.07, and $12.47, respectively.  Educational efforts 
average slightly above two meetings per county for all crops. This is to be expected as meetings 
were not commodity specific. Yield standard deviations vary substantially by county and by 
commodity. Corn has the highest variability at nearly 23.5 bushels per acre. Grain sorghum has 
an average variation of 17.8 while soybeans and wheat have averages of 8.3 and 10.3. ACRE 
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enrollment was low for all four crops and averaged between approximately 0.5% and 1%. Grain 
sorghum saw the fewest counties receiving irrigated designations with 1.9% of counties.  Wheat 
had 6.7% of counties while soybeans had 15.2% and corn had nearly 26.7%.   Complete 
summary statistics of these variables can be found in tables 5.1-5.4.  
Table 5-1: Wheat FSA ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
    .627      .2004 0     .937  
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
  
15.9816 
  
12.3205 
0   34.76   
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
  
10.3475 
   
1.2108 
   
7.5074 
  
14.1235 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment deadline 
   2.181    1.9054 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
    .0113     .0221 0     .1116 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
    .0667     .2506 0 1 
Observations: 105      
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Table 5-2: Corn FSA ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.7451 .1757 .1099 .9787 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
34.5985 31.7025 0 104.742 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-
level yield standard deviation 
23.4988 4.7188 13.4583 34.2799 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
2.2 1.9135 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0136 .0491 0 .47 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.2667 .4443 0 1 
Observations: 104      
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Table 5-3: Soybean FSA ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.7477 .1754 0.2 .9842 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
8.0715 15.6719 0 63.9257 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
8.3308 1.6474 3.8442 12.5819 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
2.1905 1.922 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0084 .0194 0 .1111 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.1524 .3611 0 1 
Observations: 105      
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Table 5-4: Grain Sorghum FSA ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.4404 .201 0.04 .8428 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
12.4737 16.5801 0 52.53 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
17.8278 3.7158 9.8725 24.7502 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
2.2 1.9135 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0054 .012 0 .0691 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.019 .1373 0 1 
Observations: 105      
 
This process is similarly repeated for the survey data. First, pre and post survey responses 
are merged utilizing a pre-assigned survey ID number. Responses that came from attendees 
residing out of the state of Kansas are dropped. The data are then cleaned in order to help 
eliminate inaccurate responses or data entry error. The dependent variable is generated from a 
categorical variable on the survey. Producers indicated whether or not they intended to enroll in 
the ARC program or not. “Yes” responses are divided by the total number of responses from a 
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county in order to determine the percentage of producers in a county that intended to enroll in 
ARC for each crop. This percentage is then utilized in the same manner as the FSA enrollment 
percentage.7 The same payment values determined in the FSA model are assigned to counties 
that had survey responses. Additionally, the same yield variations, educational efforts, ACRE 
enrollment percentages, and county designations are also used. The responses are then 
aggregated in such a way that each county had only one observation. The same OLS regression 
utilized in the FSA model is then rerun for each crop using the aggregate survey responses. 
Summary statistics for this model closely mirror those in the FSA model with slight variations 
due to observation size. Tables 5.5-5.8 contain aggregated summary statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For some county/crop combinations, there were extreme thinness in responses. In order to maintain an acceptable 
observation size, these thin observations were kept in the analysis. 
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Table 5-5: Wheat Aggregate ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.6405 .2733 0 1. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
16.4517 12.1858 0 34.76 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-
level yield standard deviation 
10.339 1.2234 7.5074 14.1235 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
2.2353 1.9252 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0116 .0224 0 .1116 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.0686 .2541 0 1 
Observations: 102      
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Table 5-6: Corn Aggregate ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
  Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.5286 .2804 0 1 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC program 
22.1637 27.2352 0 104.742 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
23.4544 4.7295 13.4583 34.2799 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment deadline 
2.2353 1.9252 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.014 .0498 0 .47 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.2745 .4485 0 1 
Observations: 102      
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Table 5-7: Soybeans Aggregate ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.4926 .3317 0 1 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC program 
6.4584 15.6998 0 63.9257 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
8.3255 1.6564 3.8442 12.5819 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment deadline 
2.2353 1.9252 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0086 .0197 0 .1111 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.1569 .3655 0 1 
Observations: 102 
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Table 5-8: Grain Sorghum Aggregate ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
.3159 .2344 0 1 
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC program 
12.4632 16.3583 0 52.53 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-level 
yield standard deviation 
18.0433 3.545 10.1018 24.7502 
Edu 
Number of total educational 
meetings held within a county 
prior to the enrollment deadline 
2.2353 1.9252 0 12 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 2013 
.0056 .0121 0 .0691 
Split_DV 
Binary variable representing 
whether a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
.0196 .1393 0 1 
Observations: 102 
     
 
 Individual Survey Response Model 
The individual survey responses are analyzed utilizing a logit model, given the structure 
of the survey design. As previously stated, producers were asked to indicate which of the three 
programs they intended to enroll in for each of the crops their farm had base acreage allocated to. 
The dependent variable (ARC-CO)\ in this model reflects if the respondent indicated that ARC 
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was their preferred program choice. It is set equal to one if the respondent chose ARC and equal 
to zero if they chose PLC. The empirical model is specified as follows 
(2) 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑖,, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖, 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖, 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸2009𝑖 ,  
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 , 𝐾𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑐, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖, 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖 , 
𝐼𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖 , 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖, 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑇𝑉𝑖, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,  
𝐾𝐹𝐵𝑖, 𝐴𝐹𝐵𝑖, 𝐾𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖, 𝐹𝑈𝑖, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖, 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 
𝑃𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝐷𝑘𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖 , 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖, 𝑃𝐿𝐶𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖, 𝐷𝑘𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖 ,  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑖,, 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐷𝐾𝑖, 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖,), 
where the subscript i denotes a variable specific to the respondent, the subscript t denotes a 
variable specific to one of the 15 meeting locations, and the subscript c denotes a variable 
specific to the county in which the respondent lives.  
 The survey data are cleaned in the same manner as the aggregation model. Days 
represents the length of time a meeting (and therefore a survey response) was from the FSA sign-
up deadline. It varies by location and ranged from 53 to 85 days. The Title variable represents a 
categorical variable if a survey respondent identified as a producer or not. The percentage of 
income that a respondent derived from production comprises the Income variable. OwnAcres and 
RentAcres are continuous variables for a producer’s total acreage. ACRE2009 represents if a 
producer stated they enrolled in the ACRE program. Coverage denotes the percent coverage a 
producer has enrolled through federal crop insurance. A Likert Scale is utilized to create the 
variable RiskAttitude. It measures on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly Agree, …, 5=Strongly 
Disagree) for the following statement: “I accept more risk in my farming business than other 
crop producers.” The same payment calculation that is included in the aggregate model 
represents the variable KSUPay. The variables HighPay and LowPay are categorical variables 
that attempt to capture changes to payment expectations caused by educational efforts. 
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Respondents were asked on both the pre and post survey to select what range of payments they 
anticipated their preferred program to pay. If a respondent’s payment expectations were higher 
for their selected program choice on the pre survey than the post survey, they are designated as 
“HighPay.” Conversely, if a respondent’s expectations were higher after engaging in educational 
efforts, they are classified as “LowPay.” InPerson, Online, PrintNews, RadioTV, OtherProd 
(other producers), and OtherSource represent where producer’s received their information 
regarding program specifics. Respondents completing the survey had the option of selecting 
multiple sources. Additionally, KFB (Kansas Farm Bureau), AFB (American Farm Bureau), 
KSCommodity (i.e. Kansas Corn Growers Association, Kansas Soybean Association, etc.), FU 
(Farmers’ Union), and OtherMember are categorical variables representing respondents’ 
affiliation with various farm organizations.   
The variables ARCCORisk, PLCRisk, and DkRisk are utilized in an indicator variable that 
dropped ARCCORisk. Producers were asked to select which program they felt offered better risk 
protection over the life of the Farm Bill—ARC, PLC or did not know. The same method is used 
for the variables ARCCOPay, PLCPay, and DkPay. Producers were asked to identify which 
program they felt would offer the highest payout for their FSA farm—ARC, PLC, or did not 
know. Indicator variables are created and equal one if a producer intended to update their base 
acreage (BaseUpdate) and zero otherwise. Similarly, variables for producers who did not intend 
to update (BaseNo), or had not yet decided if they would update their information (BaseDK) are 
used. Lastly, the dummy variable Split represents if s producer’s FSA farm number was located 
in a county designated by FSA as eligible for separate irrigated and non-irrigated payments. As 
no specific survey question addressed production methods, the creation of the Split variable is 
necessary in order to account for the possibility that a producer could have made separate 
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decisions for their irrigated and non-irrigated acres. After checking for model misspecification, 
the marginal effect of each variable is calculated. This process is repeated for the remaining three 
crops. 
 Complete summary statistics are available in tables 5.9-5.12. Intended enrollment in ARC 
ranges from nearly 67% for wheat to 33% for grain sorghum. Corn and soybean ARC 
preferences are 52% and 43%, respectively. Average experience across all crops analyzed is 
29.29 years with roughly 74% of respondents’ incomes being derived from crop production. 
Large farm acreage discrepancies cause high standard deviations in acres owned and rented with 
987 and 1265 being the average. For all four crops, respondents identified as having slightly 
above average risk aversion with a Likert Scale mean of 3.65. In-person meetings and other 
producers serve as the most popular information sources while membership in the Kansas Farm 
Bureau serves as the most popular affiliation with an agricultural organization/industry group. 
Grain sorghum has the fewest respondents from split counties at less than 2%. Wheat has 6.5% 
followed by soybeans (16.1%) and corn (33%). 
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Table 5-9: Wheat Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC-CO 
Binary variable equal to 1 if ARC-
CO was preferred program after 
education 
.6670 .4715 0 1 
Explanatory 
Variables     
Days 
Number of days prior to 
enrollment deadline educational 
meeting was attended 
71.0176 10.0613 53 85 
Title 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent identified as a 
producer 
.3740 .4841 0 1 
Experience 
Number of years involved in 
production agriculture 
29.0649 15.4366 0 70 
Income 
Percentage of income derived 
from agriculture 
73.6013 28.3978 0 100 
OwnAcres 
Number of agricultural acres 
owned 
1008.545 1842.167 0 35,000 
RentAcres 
Number of agricultural acres 
rented 
1295.186 2079.982 0 31,000 
ACRE2009 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent enrolled in ACRE 
program during previous Farm 
Bill 
.1947 .3962 0 1 
Coverage 
Percentage of crop insurance 
coverage carried on wheat acres 
40.7173 36.2398 0 85 
RiskAttitude 
Likert scale response to statement: 
“I accept more risk in my farming 
business than other crop 
producers.” 
3.6451 1.1296 1 5 
KSUPay 
K-State estimate of 2014 county 
payment for ARC-CO per acre 
21.3585 9.8621 0 34.76 
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Table 5-9: Wheat Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HighPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from preferred 
program was higher after 
attending educational meeting 
.1111 .3144 0 1 
LowPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from preferred 
program was lower after attending 
educational meeting 
.2871 .4527 0 1 
Information 
Sources 
Categorical variables denoting 
sources of information on the 
Farm Bill 
    
InPerson 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is in-person meetings 
.7184 .4500 0 1 
Online 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is online materials 
.2167 .4122 0 1 
PrintNews 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is newspaper or magazine 
.5358 .4990 0 1 
RadioTV 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is radio or television 
.1947 .3962 0 1 
OtherProd 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is other producers 
.5875 .4926 0 1 
OtherSource 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is from other outlets 
.1320 .3387 0 1 
Industry 
Membership 
Categorical variables denoting 
membership in various groups 
    
KFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Kansas Farm Bureau 
.5688 .4955 0 1 
AFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of American Farm 
Bureau 
.0451 .2076 0 1 
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Table 5-9: Wheat Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KSCommodity 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of a Kansas commodity 
group 
.1859 .3893 0 1 
FU 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Farmers Union 
.0308 .1729 0 1 
OtherMember 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of other organization 
.0506 .2193 0 1 
Risk Protection 
Categorical variables indicating 
the program with best risk 
protection 
    
PLCRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
.3289 .4701 0 1 
DkRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.1778 .3825 0 1 
Highest Payout 
Categorical variables indicating 
the program with highest annual 
payout 
    
PLCPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
.1718 .3774 0 1 
DkPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.3060 .4611 0 1 
Updating Base 
Acreage  
Categorical variables indicating 
preference for updating base 
acreage 
    
BaseNo 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected "No" 
.1054 .3073 0 1 
BaseDk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.3187 .4662 0 1 
Split 
Binary variable equal to 1 if farm 
resides in a county designated by 
FSA as eligible for split irrigated 
and non-irrigated payments 
.0638 .2445 0 1 
Observations: 
909 
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Table 5-10: Corn Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC-CO 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
ARC-CO was preferred 
program after education 
    .5248     .4996 0 1 
Explanatory  
Variables     
Days 
Number of days prior to 
enrollment deadline 
educational meeting was 
attended 
  70.6960 10.3865 53 85 
Title 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent identified as a 
producer 
    .4493     .4978 0 1 
Experience 
Number of years involved in 
production agriculture 
  28.8120   15.3446 0 70 
Income 
Percentage of income derived 
from agriculture 
  76.5432   26.8027 0 100 
OwnAcres 
Number of agricultural acres 
owned 
1116.139 2057.867  0 35,000 
RentAcres 
Number of agricultural acres 
rented 
1442.267  2258.044  0 31,000 
ACRE2009 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent enrolled in ACRE 
program during previous Farm 
Bill 
    .2217     .4157 0 1 
Coverage 
Percentage of crop insurance 
coverage carried on corn acres 
  36.8135 36.6727 0 85 
RiskAttitude 
Likert scale response to 
statement: “I accept more risk 
in my farming business than 
other crop producers.” 
   3.6070    1.1066 1 5 
KSUPay 
K-State estimate of 2014 
county payment for ARC-CO 
per acre 
  27.5224 29.0274 0 104.742 
49 
 
 
Table 5-10: Corn Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HighPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from 
preferred program was higher 
after attending educational 
meeting 
    .1175 .3222 0 1 
LowPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from 
preferred program was lower 
after attending educational 
meeting 
    .2863 .4524 0 1 
Information 
Sources 
Categorical variables denoting 
sources of information on the 
Farm Bill 
    
InPerson 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is in-person meetings 
.7533 .4314 0 1 
Online 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is online materials 
.2511  .4340 0 1 
PrintNews 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is newspaper or 
magazine 
 .5301  .4995 0 1 
RadioTV 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is radio or television 
 .2247  .4177 0 1 
OtherProd 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is other producers 
    .5962     .4910 0 1 
OtherSource 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is from other outlets 
    .1322     .3389 0 1 
Industry 
Membership 
Categorical variables denoting 
membership in various groups 
    
KFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Kansas Farm 
Bureau 
    .5918      .4919 0 1 
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Table 5-10: Corn Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of American Farm 
Bureau 
    .0543     .2268 0 1 
KSCommodity 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of a Kansas 
commodity group 
    .2217      .4157 0 1 
FU 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Farmers Union 
    .0308     .1730 0 1 
OtherMember 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of other organization 
    .0646     .2460 0 1 
Risk Protection 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program with 
best risk protection 
    
PLCRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
    .3304     .4707 0 1 
DkRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
    .1755     .3807 0 1 
Highest Payout 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program with 
highest annual payout 
    
PLCPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
    .1507     .3580  0 1 
DkPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
    .2836     .4511 0 1 
Updating Base 
Acreage  
Categorical variables 
indicating preference for 
updating base acreage 
    
BaseNo 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected "No" 
    .1003     .3006 0 1 
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Table 5-10: Corn Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BaseDk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
    .2886     .4535 0 1 
Split 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
farm resides in a county 
designated by FSA as eligible 
for split irrigated and non-
irrigated payments 
    .3113     .4634 0 1 
Observations:  
681 
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Table 5-11: Soybeans Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
 Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC-CO 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
ARC-CO was preferred 
program after education 
.4304 .4954 0 1 
Explanatory 
Variables 
    
Days 
Number of days prior to 
enrollment deadline 
educational meeting was 
attended 
72.3251 11.5209 53 85 
Title 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent identified as a 
producer 
.4669 .4994 0 1 
Experience 
Number of years involved 
in production agriculture 
29.4124 15.1374 0 70 
Income 
Percentage of income 
derived from agriculture 
76.0832 26.1457 0 100 
OwnAcres 
Number of agricultural 
acres owned 
918.6777 2022.511 0 35,000 
RentAcres 
Number of agricultural 
acres rented 
1191.006 1786.81 0 21,000 
ACRE2009 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
respondent enrolled in 
ACRE program during 
previous Farm Bill 
2136 .4102 0 1 
Coverage 
Percentage of crop 
insurance coverage carried 
on soybean acres 
37.7165 36.7425 0 85 
RiskAttitude 
Likert scale response to 
statement: “I accept more 
risk in my farming business 
than other crop producers.” 
3.6207 1.1244 1 5 
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KSUPay 
K-State estimate of 2014 
county payment for ARC-
CO per acre 
5.2353 13.6236 0 63.9257 
Table 5-12: Soybeans Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
 Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HighPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from 
preferred program was 
higher after attending 
educational meeting 
.0945 .2928 0 1 
LowPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
expected payment from 
preferred program was 
lower after attending 
educational meeting 
.2968 .4572 0 1 
Information Sources 
Categorical variables 
denoting sources of 
information on the Farm 
Bill 
    
InPerson 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is in-person 
meetings 
.7807 .4142 0 1 
Online 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is online materials 
.2457 .4309 0 1 
PrintNews 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is newspaper or 
magazine 
.5425 .4987 0 1 
RadioTV 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is radio or television 
.2042 .4035 0 1 
OtherProd 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is other producers 
.5690 .4957 0 1 
OtherSource 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
source is from other outlets 
.1267 .3329 0 1 
Industry Membership 
Categorical variables 
denoting membership in 
various groups 
    
KFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Kansas Farm 
Bureau 
.5992 .4905 0 1 
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AFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of American Farm 
Bureau 
.0643 .2455 0 1 
Table 5-13: Soybeans Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
 Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KSCommodity 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of a Kansas 
commodity group 
.2212 .4154 0 1 
FU 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of Farmers Union 
.0378 .1909 0 1 
OtherMember 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
member of other 
organization 
.0756 .2646 0 1 
Risk Protection 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program with 
best risk protection 
    
PLCRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
.3441 .4755 0 1 
DkRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.1521 .3595 0 1 
Highest Payout 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program with 
highest annual payout 
    
PLCPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected PLC 
.1374 .3446 0 1 
DkPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.25 .4334 0 1 
Updating Base 
Acreage  
Categorical variables 
indicating preference for 
updating base acreage 
    
BaseNo 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected "No" 
.0832 .2764 0 1 
BaseDk 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
selected “Don’t Know” 
.3129 .4641 0 1 
Split 
Binary variable equal to 1 if 
farm resides in a county 
designated by FSA as 
eligible for split irrigated 
and non-irrigated payments 
.0775 .2676 0 1 
Observations:  
529 
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Table 5-14: Grain Sorghum Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC-CO 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if ARC-CO was preferred 
program after education 
.3272 .4694 0 1 
Explanatory  
Variables     
Days 
Number of days prior to 
enrollment deadline 
educational meeting was 
attended 
70.2890 10.1569 53 85 
Title 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if respondent identified as 
a producer 
.3589 .4800 0 1 
Experience 
Number of years involved 
in production agriculture 
28.5822 15.1229 0 70 
Income 
Percentage of income 
derived from agriculture 
73.8777 28.1193 0 100 
OwnAcres 
Number of agricultural 
acres owned 
1024.425 1967.708 0 35,000 
RentAcres 
Number of agricultural 
acres rented 
1465.812 2253.781 0 31,000 
ACRE2009 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if respondent enrolled in 
ACRE program during 
previous Farm Bill 
.1904 .3929 0 1 
Coverage 
Percentage of crop 
insurance coverage 
carried on grain sorghum 
acres 
33.7507 35.9828 0 85 
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RiskAttitude 
Likert scale response to 
statement: “I accept more 
risk in my farming 
business than other crop 
producers.” 
3.6131 1.1024 1 5 
KSUPay 
K-State estimate of 2014 
county payment for ARC-
CO per acre 
11.0469 15.7316 0 52.53 
Table 5-15: Grain Sorghum Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HighPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if expected payment from 
preferred program was 
higher after attending 
educational meeting 
.1082 .3109 0 1 
LowPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if expected payment from 
preferred program was 
lower after attending 
educational meeting 
.2671 .4428 0 1 
Information 
Sources 
Categorical variables 
denoting sources of 
information on the Farm 
Bill 
    
InPerson 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is in-person 
meetings 
.7452 .4360 0 1 
Online 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is online 
materials 
.2397 .4272 0 1 
PrintNews 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is newspaper or 
magazine 
.5603 .4967 0 1 
RadioTV 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is radio or 
television 
.1986 .3992 0 1 
OtherProd 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is other 
producers 
.5986 .4905 0 1 
57 
 
 
OtherSource 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if source is from other 
outlets 
.1288 .3352 0 1 
Industry 
Membership 
Categorical variables 
denoting membership in 
various groups 
    
Table 5-16: Grain Sorghum Individual ARC Enrollment Summary Statistics, cont. 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AFB 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if member of American 
Farm Bureau 
.0521 .2223 0 1 
KSCommodity 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if member of a Kansas 
commodity group 
.2014 .4013 0 1 
FU 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if member of Farmers 
Union 
.0301 .1712 0 1 
OtherMember 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if member of other 
organization 
.0521 .2223 0 1 
Risk Protection 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program 
with best risk protection 
    
PLCRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected PLC 
.3384 .4735 0 1 
DkRisk 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected “Don’t Know” 
.1754 .3806 0 1 
Highest Payout 
Categorical variables 
indicating the program 
with highest annual 
payout 
    
PLCPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected PLC 
.1915 .3937 0 1 
DkPay 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected “Don’t Know” 
.3017 .4593 0 1 
Updating Base 
Acreage  
Categorical variables 
indicating preference for 
updating base acreage 
    
58 
 
 
BaseNo 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected "No" 
.1076 .3101 0 1 
BaseDk 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if selected “Don’t Know” 
.3056 .4610 0 1 
Split 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if farm resides in a county 
designated by FSA as 
eligible for split irrigated 
and non-irrigated 
payments 
.0198 .1372 0 1 
Observations:  
730      
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Chapter 6- Results 
 County-Level and Aggregate Cross Comparison 
Complete results of this analysis can be found in tables 6.1-6.4. Listed below are a summary of 
statistically significant factors affecting ARC enrollment for the four major Kansas crops.  
 Wheat 
In both the county-level and aggregated survey regressions, the estimated 2014 payment 
has a statistically significant impact on the percentage of wheat base acres enrolled in ARC. At 
the county level, a one-dollar increase in the anticipated ARC payment increased enrollment in 
the ARC program by nearly 1%. For the individual responses, a one-dollar payment increase 
contributed to a .5% increase in ARC enrollment. Additionally, ACRE enrollment is statistically 
significant in the county-level model at a 10% level. A 1% increase in ACRE enrollment for a 
county increased the likelihood of a producer enrolling in ARC by 1.4%. As indicated by the low 
R2 values of .2658 and .0245 respectively, the models capture a small portion of factors that 
producers considered when making an enrollment decision. As the results suggest, the survey 
responses for wheat program enrollment served as a representative sample of the statewide 
enrollment factors. Additionally, a representative sampling indicates that results provided by the 
individual logit modeling could provide valuable insights into how wheat producers across the 
state of Kansas selected a protection program.  
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Table 0-1: Wheat Cross Comparison Results 
    
FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Coefficient P-
Value (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of 
producers that enrolled 
in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
    
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated 
Payment Calculation 
for the ARC program 
.008 
.001 
0 
.005 
.002 
.06 
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, 
county-level yield 
standard deviation 
-   .001 
.014 
.95 
.001 
.023 
.98 
Edu 
Number of total 
educational meetings 
held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
.006 
.009 
.5 
.007 
.014 
.62 
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of 
producers that enrolled 
in ACRE in 2013 
1.423 
  .766 
.07 
- 1.83 
 1.21 
.13 
Split_DV 
Binary variable 
representing whether a 
county was allowed 
separate irrigated and 
non-irrigated program 
sign-ups 
-   .039 
    .069 
.57 
-  .058 
    .107 
.59 
  Adjusted R2: .2658 Adjusted R2: .0245 
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 Corn 
When analyzing actual ARC enrollment for corn at the county level, estimated 2014 
payments are statistically significant at a 1% level. A one-dollar payment increase led to a 
modest 0.3% increase in program enrollment. At the aggregated level, yield standard deviation 
increased enrollment by 1.2%. Additionally, being located in a split county decreased the 
likelihood of enrolling in ARC by .2%. These results are significant at a 5% and 1% significance 
level, respectively. These results indicate that survey responses for corn are not necessarily 
representative of state enrollment factors. This is likely attributable to the thin survey responses 
for many counties that have corn production. Additionally, increased production of corn and 
soybeans in recent years are not reflected in the state’s current base acreage.  The higher use of 
irrigation in the production of corn and soybeans could also be a factor in explaining the 
discrepancy in results across the two models.   
Table 0-2: Corn Cross Comparison Results 
    
FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of 
producers that enrolled 
in ARC for the 2014 
Farm Bill 
    
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated 
Payment Calculation 
for the ARC program 
   .003 
   .001 
0 
  .001 
  .001 
 .23  
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, 
county-level yield 
standard deviation 
   .003 
   .004 
 .51  
  .012 
  .006 
 .05  
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Table 0-3: Corn Cross Comparison Results, cont. 
   
 FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Edu 
Number of total 
educational meetings 
held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
-   .001 
   .009 
 .9 
  .003 
  .014 
 .83  
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of 
producers that enrolled 
in ACRE in 2013 
   .347 
   .332 
 .3   
  .094 
  .532 
 .86  
Split_DV 
Binary variable 
representing whether a 
county was allowed 
separate irrigated and 
non-irrigated program 
sign-ups 
-   .031 
   .038 
 .42  
-  .196 
  .061 
0 
  Adjusted R2: .1595 Adjusted R2: .1301 
 
 Soybeans 
As was the case with the corn comparison, the soybean analysis does not yield similar 
results across models. Enrollment in ACRE and if a county is designated as split are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. ACRE enrollment increased the likelihood of enrolling in ARC by 
1.96%. Conversely, a split designation decreased ARC enrollment by 0.11%. In the aggregation 
model, increased yield standard deviation increased ARC enrollment by nearly 6% while a split 
county designation decreased enrollment by 0.34%. Both of these results are significant at the 
1% level. As previously mentioned in the analysis of corn enrollment, thin responses for counties 
producing soybeans, low soy base acreage, and increased use of irrigation are potential causes of 
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the varied results. It is interesting to note that the R2 value for soybeans increased from .1675 in 
the FSA model to .2457 in the aggregate model. 
Table 0-4: Soybeans Cross Comparison Results 
    
FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of 
producers that 
enrolled in ARC for 
the 2014 Farm Bill 
    
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated 
Payment Calculation 
for the ARC program 
   .001 
   .001 
.3 
-  .002 
  .002 
 .38  
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, 
county-level yield 
standard deviation 
   .011 
   .01  
 .31  
  .059 
  .018 
0 
Edu 
Number of total 
educational meetings 
held within a county 
prior to the enrollment 
deadline 
   .008 
   .009 
.4 
  .022 
  .015 
 .15  
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of 
producers that 
enrolled in ACRE in 
2013 
  1.96  
   .852 
 .02  
  .99  
 1.46  
 .5   
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Table 0-5: Soybeans Cross Comparison Results, cont. 
  
FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Split_DV 
Binary variable 
representing whether 
a county was allowed 
separate irrigated and 
non-irrigated program 
sign-ups 
-   .111 
   .046 
 .02  
-  .342 
  .079 
0 
  Adjusted R2: .1675 Adjusted R2: .2457 
 
 Grain Sorghum 
Estimated ARC payments for 2014 as well as yield standard deviation are statistically 
significant factors affecting FSA enrollment for grain sorghum. Both variables increased the 
likelihood of enrolling in ARC by 0.6% (1% significance level) and 0.8% (10% significance 
level). At the aggregated level, educational efforts is the only significant factor. With the 
exception of corn, grain sorghum was the only crop of the four analyzed to have a projected 2014 
price below that of the reference price established in the PLC program. As a result, grain 
sorghum enrollment favored PLC.  
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Table 0-6: Grain Sorghum Cross Comparison Results 
    
FSA County-Level 
Data (Obs=105) 
Individual Survey 
Data (Obs=102) 
Variable Definition 
Coefficient P-
Value 
Coefficient P-
Value 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
     
ARC_Enroll 
Percentage of producers 
that enrolled in ARC for 
the 2014 Farm Bill 
    
Explanatory 
Variables 
     
Est_Pay 
2014 Estimated Payment 
Calculation for the ARC 
program 
   .006 
   .001 
0 
  .002 
  .002 
 .22  
Yield_Std 
20 year historical, county-
level yield standard 
deviation 
   .008 
   .005 
 .09  
  .005 
  .007 
 .48  
Edu 
Number of total 
educational meetings held 
within a county prior to 
the enrollment deadline 
   .006 
   .009 
 .5 
  .023 
  .012 
 .06  
ACRE_Perc 
Percentage of producers 
that enrolled in ACRE in 
2013 
   .656 
  1.46  
 .66  
- 2.862 
 1.986 
 .15  
Split_DV 
Binary variable 
representing whether a 
county was allowed 
separate irrigated and non-
irrigated program sign-ups 
   .089 
   .122 
 .47  
  .127 
  .166 
 .45  
  Adjusted R2: .2833 Adjusted R2: .0323 
 
 Individual Survey Response Model 
Complete results of this analysis can be found in tables 6.6-6.9. Listed below are a summary of 
statistically significant factors affecting ARC enrollment for the four major Kansas crops.  
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 Wheat 
Twelve variables are identified to significantly alter ARC enrollment for Kansas wheat 
producers. Days, Coverage, KSCommodity, LowPay, and KSUPay all positively impacted 
selection of ARC. LowPay has the largest marginal effect—increasing ARC enrollment by 6.9% 
if a producer’s payment expectations were higher after attending educational meetings. This 
result is significant at a 5% level. Membership in a commodity organization (KSCommodity) 
increased ARC selection by 6.8% at a 10% significance level. Days, Coverage, and KSUPay all 
have minimal positive marginal effects on ARC enrollment at 0.2%, 0.1%, and 0.8%, 
respectively. Factors negatively impacting ARC selection include Experience, AFB, PLCRisk, 
DkRisk, PLCPay, DkPay, and BaseDk. PLCRisk and DkRisk have large marginal impacts of 
21.4% and 20.1% with both results being significant at a 1% level. Additionally, PLCPay and 
DkPay decreased enrollment at a rate of 39.6% and 13.5%, respectively. These results are also 
significant at the 1% level.  
There are several potential causes for these results. As PLC was the default program and 
all established producers would have had familiarity with a price based option, producers’ 
preferences could have been biased towards PLC. Additionally, given producer’s risk aversion, a 
more familiar (and less complicated) program could have had more appeal than one that was 
unfamiliar and complex. At a 5% significance level, membership in the American Farm Bureau 
as well as uncertainty of updating base acreage reduced the likelihood of enrolling in ARC by 
12.2% and 6.1%. Lastly, increased farm experience negatively impacted ARC enrollment by 
0.2% for every year of experience a producer possessed. One potential cause of experience 
reducing a producer’s preference could come from the possibility that more experienced 
producers have experienced very low commodity prices such as during the 1980s. To a producer 
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that had seen extreme decline in crop prices, the potential for prices to decline again would make 
a price based program much more appealing given its catastrophic payout ability.  
Table 0-5: Wheat Individual Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect P Value 
Dependent Variable: 
ARC-CO 
    
Days 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.09 
Title 0.161 0.191 0.026 0.40 
Experience -0.01 0.006 -0.002 0.10 
Income 1.20E-03 3.30E-03 0.000 0.70 
OwnAcres -3.80E-04 4.20E-04 0.000 0.37 
RentAcres -5.80E-05 3.90E-04 0.000 0.14 
ACRE2009 -0.289 0.219 -0.047 0.19 
Coverage 6.00E-03 2.00E-03 0.001 0.02 
RiskAttitude 9.00E-03 0.074 0.001 0.90 
InPerson 0.007 0.202 0.001 0.97 
Online 0.188 0.212 0.031 0.38 
PrintNews 0.071 0.189 0.012 0.71 
RadioTV 0.058 0.225 0.009 0.80 
OtherProd -0.159 0.184 -0.026 0.39 
OtherSource 0.232 0.256 0.038 0.37 
KFB 0.13 0.179 0.021 0.47 
AFB -0.744 0.373 -0.122 0.05 
KSCommodity 0.416 0.229 0.068 0.07 
FU 0.32 0.486 0.052 0.51 
OtherMember 0.022 0.357 0.004 0.95 
HighPay -0.083 0.275 -0.014 0.76 
LowPay 0.423 0.208 0.069 0.04 
KSUPay 0.047 0.009 0.008 < 0.000 
PLCRisk -1.254 0.2 -0.214 < 0.000 
DkRisk -1.186 0.248 -0.201 < 0.000 
PLCPay -2.091 0.242 -0.396 < 0.000 
DkPay -0.8 0.215 -0.135 < 0.000 
BaseNo -0.439 0.287 -0.073 0.13 
BaseDk -0.371 0.191 -0.061 0.05 
Split 0.366 0.341 0.06 0.28 
Constant 0.367 0.751  0.78 
Pseudo R2 0.2136    
Number of Obs. 874    
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 Corn 
Factors positively impacting enrollment in ARC for corn producers include Title, Income, 
Coverage, Online, RadioTV, OtherMember, and KSUPay. The largest positive, marginal change 
came from the variable OtherMember (14.8%) and is significant at a 5% level. Information 
sources including Online and RadioTV increased enrollment by 9.7% and 10.5%, respectively. If 
a survey respondent identified as a producer increased ARC enrollment by 7.9% at a 1% 
significance level. Variables increasing enrollment by less than 1% include Income, Coverage, 
and KSUPay. As seen in the wheat results, PLCRisk, DkRisk, PLCPay, DkPay, and BaseDk all 
negatively impacted ARC enrollment. The impact of these variables range from 6.3% (BaseDk) 
to 26.8% (PLCPay). Additionally, RiskAttitude reduced the likelihood of enrolling in ARC by 
2.3%, supporting the notion that a producer’s risk preferences factor into their expectations of 
payment and risk protection for ARC and PLC. Experience also had similar impacts on corn 
enrollment in ARC: increased experience levels reduced likelihood of selecting ARC by 0.2% 
for every year of experience. The Split categorical variable also proves statistically significant 
and reduced ARC selection by 5.3%. This is unsurprising given the larger number of counties 
designated as split for corn and soybeans than for that of wheat and grain sorghum. This result is 
significant at a 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
 
Table 0-6: Corn Individual Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect P Value 
Dependent Variable: 
ARC-CO 
  
 
 
Days -0.005 0.009 -0.001 0.57 
Title 0.459 0.174 0.079 0.01 
Experience -0.013 0.006 -0.002 0.02 
Income 0.009 3.00E-03 0.002 0.01 
OwnAcres 8.20E-05 6.20E-05 0.000 0.19 
RentAcres 1.07E-05 4.70E-05 0.000 0.82 
ACRE2009 -0.155 0.215 -0.027 0.47 
Coverage 2.50E-02 3.00E-03 0.004 < 0.000 
RiskAttitude -0.131 0.074 -0.023 0.08 
InPerson 0.209 0.194 0.036 0.28 
Online 0.561 0.213 0.097 0.01 
PrintNews -0.082 0.183 -0.014 0.65 
RadioTV 0.61 0.219 0.105 0.01 
OtherProd -0.017 0.179 -0.003 0.93 
OtherSource 0.127 0.246 0.022 0.61 
KFB 0.13 0.173 0.023 0.45 
AFB -0.426 0.396 -0.074 0.28 
KSCommodity 0.115 0.219 0.020 0.60 
FU 0.696 0.453 0.120 0.12 
OtherMember 0.855 0.362 0.148 0.02 
HighPay -0.178 0.268 -0.031 0.51 
LowPay 0.219 0.198 0.038 0.27 
KSUPay 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.09 
PLCRisk -0.621 0.196 -0.109 0.002 
DkRisk -0.668 0.247 -0.117 0.01 
PLCPay -1.493 0.253 -0.268 < 0.000 
DkPay -0.597 0.205 -0.109 0.004 
BaseNo 0.055 0.278 0.010 0.84 
BaseDk -0.36 0.189 -0.063 0.06 
Split -0.304 0.183 -0.053 0.10 
Constant 1.24 0.758  0.87 
Pseudo R2 0.2494    
Number of Obs. 874    
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 Soybeans 
Income, Coverage, InPerson, Online, OtherMember, and LowPay represent factors 
positively impacting ARC enrollment for soybeans. While Income and Coverage had minimal 
impacts of less than 1%, information sources of InPerson and Online increased ARC selection 
by 5.3% and 7.6%. Other significant marginal effects include OtherMember (18.9%) and 
LowPay (8.7%)—both of which are significant at a 1% level. DkRisk, PLCPay, DkPay, and Split 
followed similar effects shown in ARC selection for corn. Marginal effects were determined to 
decrease ARC enrollment by 11.2% for DkRisk, 26% for PLCPay, 13.3% for DkPay, and 14.1% 
for Split. All of these results are found to be significant at a 1% level. Unlike corn and wheat, not 
updating base acreage (BaseNo) is found to be significant as opposed to BaseDk. It caused a 
9.8% decline in likelihood of choosing ARC.  
Table 0-7: Soybeans Individual Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect P Value 
Dependent Variable: 
ARC-CO     
Days 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.22 
Title 0.192 0.177 0.030 0.28 
Experience -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.31 
Income 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.003 
OwnAcres -5.03E-05 0.0000459 0.000 0.273 
RentAcres -1.07E-04 0.0000484 0.000 0.027 
ACRE2009 -0.103 0.224 -0.016 0.645 
Coverage 0.031 0.003 0.005 < 0.000 
RiskAttitude -0.111 0.077 -0.017 0.15 
InPerson 0.335 0.206 0.053 0.10 
Online 0.483 0.217 0.076 0.03 
PrintNews 0.181 0.192 0.028 0.35 
RadioTV 0.100 0.227 0.016 0.66 
OtherProd -0.132 0.189 -0.021 0.49 
OtherSource -0.315 0.263 -0.050 0.23 
KFB -0.161 0.182 -0.025 0.38 
AFB -0.381 0.410 -0.060 0.35 
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Table 0-7: Soybeans Individual Results, cont. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect P Value 
KSCommodity 0.199 0.223 0.031 0.37 
FU 0.589 0.475 0.093 0.22 
OtherMember 1.196 0.374 0.189 0.001 
HighPay -0.405 0.275 -0.064 0.14 
LowPay 0.551 0.207 0.087 0.01 
KSUPay 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.67 
PLCRisk -0.218 0.203 -0.035 0.28 
DkRisk -0.718 0.272 -0.112 0.01 
PLCPay -1.628 0.276 -0.260 < 0.000 
DkPay -0.781 0.217 -0.133 < 0.000 
BaseNo -0.627 0.301 -0.098 0.04 
BaseDk -0.244 0.200 -0.039 0.22 
Split -0.953 0.270 -0.141 < 0.000 
Constant -1.225 0.816  0.13 
Pseudo R2 0.2989    
Number of Obs. 874    
     
 
 Grain Sorghum  
Grain sorghum has the fewest significant factors impacting ARC enrollment. Days and 
Coverage increased ARC selection by less than 1% each with both at a 5% significance level. 
Title, OtherProd, PLCRisk, DkRisk, and PLCPay negatively affected enrollment. At a 10% 
significance level, OtherProd caused a marginal decline of 5.4%. Substantial decreases were 
caused by Title (11.6%), PLCRisk (19.4%), DkRisk (17.6%), and PLCPay (19%). These results 
are significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 0-8: Grain Sorghum Individual Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Marginal Effect P Value 
Dependent Variable: 
ARC-CO 
    
Days 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.05 
Title -0.590 0.164 -0.116 < 0.000 
Experience -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.41 
Income -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.78 
OwnAcres -2.03E-05 4.10E-05 0.000 0.62 
RentAcres -2.35E-05 0.0000378 0.000 0.53 
ACRE2009 0.041 0.197 0.008 0.84 
Coverage 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.05 
RiskAttitude 0.003 0.069 0.001 0.96 
InPerson -0.042 0.184 -0.008 0.82 
Online 0.076 0.194 0.015 0.70 
PrintNews 0.133 0.173 0.026 0.44 
RadioTV 0.058 0.199 0.012 0.77 
OtherProd -0.277 0.169 -0.054 0.10 
OtherSource -0.366 0.234 -0.072 0.12 
KFB -0.175 0.162 -0.034 0.28 
AFB 0.338 0.344 0.066 0.33 
KSCommodity 0.233 0.199 0.046 0.24 
FU -0.145 0.447 -0.029 0.75 
OtherMember 0.260 0.323 0.051 0.42 
HighPay -0.139 0.248 -0.027 0.57 
LowPay 0.064 0.186 0.130 0.73 
KSUPay 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.42 
PLCRisk -0.959 0.187 -0.194 < 0.000 
DkRisk -0.852 0.237 -0.176 < 0.000 
PLCPay -1.054 0.261 -0.190 < 0.000 
DkPay -0.167 0.193 -0.035 0.39 
BaseNo -0.103 0.263 -0.020 0.70 
BaseDk -0.241 0.180 -0.047 0.18 
Split 0.550 0.532 0.108 0.30 
Constant -0.674 0.710  0.34 
Pseudo R2 0.093    
Number of Obs. 874    
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Chapter 7 - Policy Implications 
The results of both the aggregate and individual analyses across all four crops indicate the 
many different considerations that producers weighed when selecting a farm safety net program. 
Additionally, given the different pricing, yield, and production possibilities across commodities, 
it is difficult to give an aggregate response for enrollment factors of Kansas producers that grew 
multiple crops. While these results yielded statistically significant program selection factors, the 
limited scope of survey analysis certainly did not capture all enrollment considerations. 
Additionally as noted by Mitchell (2012), the survey was only capable of capturing producers’ 
enrollment intentions given the possibility that new information or changes in preference could 
alter their enrollment choice before the sign-up deadline.  
Interpreting the results of this analysis and potential impacts of 2014 Farm Bill program 
design requires understanding the geopolitical and farm financial climate leading up to the 
program sign-up. Prior to the deadline, producers had seen some of the highest net farm returns 
in their lifetimes. As a result, they had yet to feel the full effects of the declining farm economy 
that began in 2014. Significant considerations taken by future legislative efforts should take care 
to consider producer experience, risk preferences and both past and future commodity market 
scenarios when designing farm policy. Whereas recent farm policy design has taken a more 
retroactive development approach, future legislators should take care to also assess what the 
future may hold for the production agriculture industry. 
As producers were only allowed to make a one-time program selection over the life of the 
bill, extensive planning was required on their part to fully assess the possible scenarios facing 
their operation given different commodity price and yield combinations. The incomplete 
information dilemma that faced producers hindered their ability to most effectively select a 
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program that would best protect them over the five year life of the legislation.8 As a result, 
producers were forced to rely on past experiences, information provided from third party sources 
(such as commodity organizations), or make their decision at random. The complex design of 
ARC also gave producers incentive to consider a more easily understood alternative in PLC. 
Given the drastic change in program options from 2002-2014 as well as the complexity of the 
ARC program, legislators should consider utilizing as many working aspects of ARC and PLC as 
possible. Adjustments should be made where necessary in order to best benefit the largest 
number of producers based on the desired congressional goals of the legislation. This would 
allow producers to become familiar with the intricacies of the program and best be able to judge 
if it provides the greatest risk protection for their individual operation as opposed to only 
understanding its effects at an aggregate level.  
While this analysis does provide insight into how a producer in Kansas might have 
selected a farm safety net, it leaves many more questions than answers. Understanding why a 
specific enrollment factor was of particular significance to a producer can be challenging. It is 
important that moving forward, the design of farm policy takes into consideration individual 
characteristics of producers, their operations, and their risk preferences. Given the different 
scopes of PLC and ARC (catastrophic versus shallow coverage), legislators should also seek to 
identify what goals they hope to accomplish in the design of farm policy. Should programs 
maximize payments to producers or limit them in order to reduce federal outlays? Should special 
care be given to design programs that disproportionately benefit less experienced producers over 
                                                 
8 Given the transaction costs associated with offering the producers the ability to re-enroll in a program, a 
compromise should be found to strike a balance between administrative costs of enrolling producers in FSA 
programs while reducing deadweight loss accrued by producers as a result of incomplete information. 
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more experienced? Additionally, given the results of this research, should lawmakers consider 
directives that provide additional funding for educational efforts in order for producers to make 
an informed program choice? 
Although not within the scope of this research, other potential considerations should be 
taken to assess the effectiveness of these programs in conjunction with Federal Crop Insurance 
also provided under the Farm Bill. Other research opportunities by which to inform the 
legislative process include completing the cross comparison and logit models for other Kansas 
crops in addition to major crops in other states that utilized similar extension surveys. 
Additionally, this opportunity could be expanded to represent a multivariate approach capable of 
identifying switching patterns across respondents. For producers initially stating a preference for 
ARC but indicating PLC as their program of choice in the post survey, what factors contributed 
to the decision to change program choice? This process could be repeated for producers 
intending to enroll in PLC but selecting ARC, as well as for identifying what factors contributed 
to a respondent maintaining their initial choice. This process would strengthen what is currently 
known about extension efforts to educate about farm policy as well as deepen the understanding 
for how expectations and beliefs weigh into a program selection.   
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
Regardless of the results of this research, what is clear is that the U.S. agricultural 
economy is currently in a precarious state. Moving forward given the uncertainty surrounding 
commodity markets, it is imperative that future farm legislation have an effective design by 
which to protect producers from downside risk. The two programs offered by the 2014 Farm Bill 
offered flexible options in order for producers to select a program that fit their risk preferences 
and production scheme. However, given the five year commitment of the enrollment choice, 
producers were faced with a scenario in which little information was available for them to make 
an informed decision. Additionally, given the complexity of the ARC program as well as the 
option to update base acreages and yields, producers were overwhelmed with choices. 
These results suggest that expectations such as what program a producer felt would pay 
more or offer better risk protection weighed heavily into their selection decision. Other relevant 
factors included updating base acreage as well as if a county offered split irrigated and non-
irrigated payments for crops that had a larger number of split county designations. Risk attitudes 
factored heavily into a producer’s intended program choice although it should be noted that 
stated producer program preference is not always the program in which they enroll in as noted by 
Mitchell (2012). Other factors affecting enrollment preferences included information sources that 
producers utilized to educate them about their options in addition to affiliations with agricultural 
organizations such as a commodity group.  
As previously stated, a one-time enrollment decision over a five year program left 
producers with much uncertainty surrounding which program would offer the best protection for 
their operation. Differing expectations across producers for how various protection programs 
should function (i.e. minimize losses or maximizing payments) led to a variety of factors 
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affecting enrollment at the individual level. Further complicating producers’ decisions included 
understanding how updating base acreage and yields would affect their program choice. Limited 
information available concerning commodity yields and prices in the later years of the legislation 
forced producers to rely on estimates and expectations for years 2017 and 2018. This situation 
could prove challenging if the farm economy is in a drastically different state between 2014 and 
2018. A program selection that functioned effectively for a producer in 2014 might not provide 
the desired safety net in 2018 if substantial changes occur in commodity markets, weather, etc.  
The results of this research also suggest that legislators should consider producers’ 
expectations and preferences when designing farm policy. Additionally, they should take care to 
not have a one-dimensional approach to policy design—both a retroactive and forward looking 
approach should be utilized in order to develop the most efficient safety net programs that also 
meet the intended outcomes of the legislation. Producers’ payment and risk preferences as well 
as their outlook for the agricultural sector are founded in their experiences and information 
available to them. As such, legislators should offer programs that allow producers the 
opportunity to fully assess the impacts of their enrollment choice and select a program that meets 
their specific needs for farm policy. In order for this to occur, farm legislation should consider 
what aspects of previous farm bills worked/didn’t work, what the current state of the farm 
economy looks like as well as what considerations should be made when writing the legislation, 
as well as what the farm economy might look like in future years of the life of a farm bill.  
Understanding the factors affecting Farm Bill program selection at the individual level is 
a complex task. Recognizing the diverse needs and expectations of producers is the first step in 
designing farm policy that benefits the greatest number of producers. By providing both a 
revenue and price based program, the 2014 Farm Bill offered producers the choice between 
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catastrophic and shallow risk coverage based on their risk preferences and expectations of the 
future farm economy. Moving forward, farm safety net programs should continue to evolve to 
meet the current and future market possibilities in order to best protect American producers.  
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Appendix A - List of Acronyms 
AAA Agricultural Adjustment Act 
ACRE Average Crop Revenue Election 
ARC  Agriculture Risk Coverage  
ARMS Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
CBO Congressional Budget Office 
CCP Counter-cyclical Payments 
ERS Economic Research Service 
FSA Farm Service Agency 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
KFMA Kansas Farm Management Association 
LDP Loan Deficiency Payments 
MYA Marketing Year Average 
NASS National Agriculture Statistics Service 
OA Olympic Average 
PLC Price Loss Coverage 
RMA Risk Management Agency 
SCO Supplemental Coverage Option 
STAX Stacked Income Protection Plan 
SNAP Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
WTO World Trade Organization  
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Appendix B - Survey Instruments 
2014 Farm Bill Pre-Survey Questions 
Thank you for taking the time to answer our survey questions. You answers will be anonymous. 
This survey is part of a research project designed to aid policy makers in decisions on future 
farm policy.  
 
1. Which best describes you? 
a. _____ landowner (you lease out most of your ag land) 
b. _____ farmer/rancher (you primarily operate ag land) 
c. _____ farm manager (you manage land for others) 
d. _____ lender 
e. _____ educator 
f. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
2. How many total acres of cropland do you own and/or rent? 
a. Owned land: _____ acres 
b. Rented land: _____ acres 
 
3. How many years have you been farming, owned farmland, or managed farmland? 
a. _____ years 
 
4. What percent of your primary source of agricultural income is from crops? 
a. _____ % 
 
5. Did you sign up for the ACRE program under the 2008 Farm Bill? 
a. _____ yes 
b. _____ no 
c. _____ don’t know  
 
6. Have you gathered information about the 2014 Farm Bill programs from any of the following 
sources, including today’s meeting? (check all that apply) 
a. _____ in-person meetings  
b. _____ online videos or webinars  
c. _____ newspapers or magazines 
d. _____ radio or television  
e. _____ talking to other producers  
f. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
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7. Are you a member of any farm organizations? (check all that apply) 
a. _____ Kansas Farm Bureau 
b. _____ American Farm Bureau  
c. _____ Kansas commodity groups (corn, wheat, grain sorghum, soybean) 
d. _____ Farmers Union 
e. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you own or operate cropland that is registered with the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and 
has a unique FSA farm number? 
a. _____ yes 
b. _____ no 
c. _____ don’t know  
 
9. How many FSA farms do you own or operate?  
a. _____ farms 
 
Of these farms, please select your largest (in acres) FSA farm to answer the following questions: 
10. What state is your FSA farm located in? 
a. __________________________  
 
11. What county is your FSA farm primarily located in? 
a. __________________________  
 
12. Which of the following crops have you planted on your FSA farm in the past 5 years? 
 (select all that apply) 
a. _____ wheat 
b. _____ corn 
c. _____ soybeans 
d. _____ grain sorghum 
e. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
13. On your FSA farm, which of the following crops has the largest number of FSA base acres? 
(please select only one) 
a. _____ wheat 
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b. _____ corn 
c. _____ soybeans 
d. _____ grain sorghum 
e. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
14. If you rent this farm, what type of lease do you have? 
a. _____ crop share 
b. _____ fixed cash rent 
c. _____ other, please specify: ____________________________________________ 
 
Please answer the following questions for your FSA farm as if you are the sole decision maker: 
15. Did you, or are you planning to, update the FSA program yields for any of your base acre 
crops? 
a. _____ yes 
b. _____ no 
c. _____ don’t know  
 
16. Did you, or are you planning to, reallocate the FSA base acres on your farm? 
a. _____ yes 
b. _____ no 
c. _____ don’t know  
 
17. If you enrolled today in the farm bill programs, which program(s) would you select for the 
following commodities on your FSA farm: 
 
Wheat Corn 
Grain 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Agricultural Risk Coverage at the 
Individual Level (ARC-IC)  
□ □ □ □ 
Agricultural Risk Coverage at the County 
Level (ARC-CO) 
□ □ □ □ 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) □ □ □ □ 
Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) □ □ □ □ 
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18. For the programs you listed in the previous question, what do you expect the annual payouts 
to be? 
a. _____ $0 per acre/year 
b. _____ $1 - $30 per acre/year 
c. _____ $31 - $60 per acre/year 
d. _____ $61 - $90 per acre/year 
e. _____ more than $90 per acre/year 
 
19. Please rate your agreement with these statements (circle one number for each statement) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Don’t 
Know 
I usually like “playing it safe” (for instance, 
“locking in a price”) instead of taking risks for 
market prices of my crops. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
When selling/marketing my crops, I prefer 
financial certainty to financial uncertainty. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
When selling/marketing my crops, I am willing 
to take higher financial risks in order to realize 
higher average returns. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
I like taking financial risks with my farming 
business. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
I accept more risk in my farming business than 
other crop producers. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
With respect to the conduct of business, I 
dislike risk. 
1 2 3 4 5 * 
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20. Did you buy crop insurance for the 2014-2015 season? If yes, please check the type and fill 
in the percentage of coverage: 
 
Wheat Corn 
Grain 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Revenue Protection  □ □ □ □ 
Yield Protection □ □ □ □ 
Revenue Protection-Harvest Price 
Exclusion 
□ □ □ □ 
% of Coverage     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We encourage you to utilize related Agricultural Act of 2014 (Farm Bill) resources available 
at www.AgManager.info. If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Dr. 
Mykel Taylor (mtaylor@k-state.edu) or Dr. Glynn Tonsor (gtonsor@k-state.edu).  
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2014 Farm Bill Post Survey Questions 
Please answer the following questions for your largest (in acres) FSA farm as if you are the sole 
decision maker: 
1. If you signed up today for the farm bill programs, which program(s) would you select for the 
following commodities on your FSA farm: 
 
Wheat Corn 
Grain 
Sorghum 
Soybeans 
Agricultural Risk Coverage at the 
Individual Level (ARC-IC)  
□ □ □ □ 
Agricultural Risk Coverage at the County 
Level (ARC-CO) 
□ □ □ □ 
Price Loss Coverage (PLC) □ □ □ □ 
Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) □ □ □ □ 
 
2.  For the programs you listed in the previous question, what do you expect the annual payouts 
to be? 
a. _____ $0 per acre/year 
b. _____ $1 - $30 per acre/year 
c. _____ $31 - $60 per acre/year 
d. _____ $61 - $90 per acre/year 
e. _____ more than $90 per acre/year 
 
The following questions help us to better understand your outlook on farming and government 
programs. Even if you are not sure, please give us your best guess. 
3. Which program do you think will have the highest total payout across the next five years? 
a. _____ Agricultural Risk Coverage at the Individual Level (ARC-IC) 
b. _____ Agricultural Risk Coverage at the County Level (ARC-CO) 
c. _____ Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
d. _____ don’t know 
 
4.  Which program do you think offers the most income risk protection for your farm over the 
next five years?  
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a. _____ Agricultural Risk Coverage at the Individual Level (ARC-IC) 
b. _____ Agricultural Risk Coverage at the County Level (ARC-CO) 
c. _____ Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
d. _____ don’t know 
 
 
5. What do you expect commodity prices to do in the next five years? 
a. _____ increase from current prices 
b. _____ decrease from current prices 
c. _____ stay about the same as current prices 
d. _____ don’t know 
 
6. What do you expect yields in your county to do over the next five years? 
a. _____ increase from historic yields 
b. _____ decrease from historic yields 
c. _____ stay about the same as historic yields 
d. _____ don’t know 
 
7. What do you expect your farm’s yields to be over the next five years as compared to the 
county average? 
a. _____ my farm’s yields will be above the county average 
b. _____ my farm’s yields will be below the county average 
c. _____ my farm yield will have about the same as the county average 
d. _____ don’t know 
 
8. How much do you value the information you received from the meeting today? 
a. _____ not valuable at all 
b. _____ somewhat valuable 
c. _____ valuable 
d. _____ very valuable 
 
9. List the most important thing(s) you learned during today’s meeting: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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10. Please share any other comments you have about the facility, materials, speakers, or anything 
else you would like us to know: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We encourage you to utilize related Agricultural Act of 2014 (Farm Bill) resources available 
at www.AgManager.info. If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Dr. 
Mykel Taylor (mtaylor@k-state.edu) or Dr. Glynn Tonsor (gtonsor@k-state.edu).  
